Some Effects of Modern Weapons Systems Development on the American Economy by Braginsky, Maurice
Utah State University 
DigitalCommons@USU 
All Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate Studies 
5-1964 
Some Effects of Modern Weapons Systems Development on the 
American Economy 
Maurice Braginsky 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd 
 Part of the Economics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Braginsky, Maurice, "Some Effects of Modern Weapons Systems Development on the American Economy" 
(1964). All Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 2822. 
https://digitalcommons.usu.edu/etd/2822 
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Graduate Studies at DigitalCommons@USU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in All Graduate Theses and 
Dissertations by an authorized administrator of 
DigitalCommons@USU. For more information, please 
contact digitalcommons@usu.edu. 
SOME EFFECTS OF MODERN WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 
ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 
by 
Maurice Braginsky 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the degree 
of 
~"STER OF SCIENCE 
in 
Economics 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY 
Logan, Utah 
1964 
ACKNOWLEDGMENT 
The author wishes to express his appreciation and gratitude 
to Dr. Leonard J. Arrington for his invaluable assistance and con-
tinuous guidance in the preparation of this study. The writer is 
also indebted to Doctors Reed R. Durtschi and Reynold K. Watkins 
a nd to Professor Glenn F. Marston for their va luab l e suggestions. 
Appreciation is also due to my daughter, Joan, who gave gen-
erously of h r time in the typing of the many rough drafts and revisions 
necessary in th e preparation of this manuscript. 
Maurice Bragins ky 
CHAPTER I - INIRODUCTION 
The Military Backdrop 
The Buildup 
The Expenditures 
The Pervasiveness 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
CHAPTER II - THE ENVIRONMENT OF WEAPONS SYSTEM DEVELOPMENT 
Uncertainty of Weapons Development 
The Need to Improve Planning 
Revising the Deve lopment Concept 
Project Definition 
A Singl e Buyer: Monopsony 
The Administration of Wea pons Systems Development 
Incentive Contracts 
A Weapons Systems Development Program 
CHAPTER III - IMPACT ON GEOGRA PHICAL AREAS 
The Background 
Effects of Reduced Military Expenditures 
Geogra phi c Concentra tion of Spendlng for Weapons 
Sys t ems 
Concen tration of Res earch and Development 
The Procurement Mix of the Weapons Industry 
Geographic Shifts of Weapons Procurement 
Preparation for Reduced or Shifting Defense Spending 
Political Implications of Defense Spending 
Conc entration of Military Contracts 
CHAPTER IV - SMALL BUSINESS AND DEFENSE PROCUREMENT 
Def inition of Small Business 
Interest in Small Business 
A "Fair Share" for Small Business 
The Small Business Share of the Defense Dollar 
The Subcontracting Program 
The Set-Aside Program 
Increasing Competition 
Research and Development 
Organized Aid to Small Business 
CHAPTER V - RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Role of the Government 
Balance between Defense and Civilian Purposes 
1 
1 
3 
6 
10 
10 
17 
18 
20 
22 
23 
27 
31 
37 
37 
38 
42 
44 
46 
47 
49 
53 
55 
58 
58 
59 
62 
64 
70 
74 
77 
78 
81 
84 
84 
87 
CHAPTER V (continued) 
Duplication of Research 89 
Benefits of Military Research to the Civilian Sector 91 
Primary Benefits of Military Research 93 
The Need for Competent Personnel 94 
Non- Profit Organizations 97 
Competition between Industry and Non- Profit Organi-
zations 100 
Maximum Transfer of Benefits to the Civilian Sector 100 
Patent Policies 102 
Need for a Single Patent Policy 105 
Summary 107 
CHAPTER VI - MANPOWER, EDUCATION AND THE UNIVERSITY 109 
Requirements for Engineers and Scientists 109 
The Need for Qua 1 ity and Advanced Training 114 
Magnitude of Federal Expentidures on Universities 118 
Effects on Teaching 120 
Freedom of the University 122 
Basic Research 122 
Objectives of Federal Agencies vs. Objectives of 
Universities 124 
The Use of Grants or Contracts 125 
Overhead Costs 126 
Benefits to the University 128 
Advancement of National Objectives 128 
Protection for the University 129 
CHAPTER VII - SUMMARY AND CONCLUS I ONS 132 
The Unpredictability and the Constraints 
The Changing Geography 
The Small Business Community 
Research and Development 
The University 
LITERATURE CI TED 
132 
134 
135 
137 
137 
150 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 
1. Expenditures for Department of Defense military 
functions as a percentage of gross national product, 
fiscal years 1959-1963 (billions of dollars) 
2. Development cost and time variance factors in twelve 
weapons programs 
3. Total factor increases in average cumulative cost 
of production (adjusted) . 
4. Defense contract awards and estimated annual payrolls 
by states, 1961 and 1962 . 
5. Percent of defense contract awards to first 100 
companies 
Page 
4 
3 
16 
40 
56 
6. Award s by type of contractor (by fiscal year ) 61 
7. Award s by procurement program (by fiscal yea r) 66 
8. Defense small business subcontracting program (by fiscal 
year) 69 
9. Set-asides agreed to and set-aside procurement awards 75 
10. J oint set-asides, comparison of fiscal years 1954-1962 76 
11. Award s for experimenta l, developmental, test and research 
work, by type of contractor 80 
12. Federal expenditures for research and development, fiscal 
years 1953-1963 (in millions of dollars) 85 
13. Summary information concerning the distribution of 
national research and development funds 86 
14. Scientists and engineers in research and development by 
sector 1954, 1958, and 1960 . 110 
15. Numbers achieved and goa ls for th e future in graduate 
education in engineering, mathematics, and the physica l 
sciences 115 
Table 
16. Total cost of recommended national progra~ for 
graduate training in EMP, through fiscal year 
1970 
17. R&D obligations to educational institutions by 
selected agency, fiscal year 1962 (estimated) 
LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 
l. Awards to small and other business firms 
Page 
119 
120 
Page 
CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Military Backdrop 
The Cold War goes on : And the use of mi lita ry strength by the 
United States as a backdrop to other forms of persuation--political, 
ideological, diplomatic, and economic--continues. The use of a military 
backdrop as an instrument of national policy will probably continue in-
definitely because it is unlikely that the Soviet Union or Communist 
China will change their objectives of expansionism; it is too much an 
integral part of their ideo l ogy. The easing of tensions between th e 
United States and the Soviet Union since the Cuban crisis In 1962 is 
perhaps an indication of a change in tactics and diplomacy, but it would 
be naive to believe that the objective of a Communist-dominated world 
has been forgotten. Further, the dispute between Communist China and 
the Soviet Union is not over the objective, but over the means of its 
achievement, and over who will control the world-wide Communist movement. 
The Buildup 
As a result of the United States policy to present a strong mili-
tary posture, there has been a constant bui ldup of strength ov er an extended 
period si nce the Korean war. First, this buildup manifested i t self in the 
development of weapons systems such as the B-52 and B- 47 fleets and the 
Atlas and Tital missiles and th e Po l aris and its submari ne carrier, along 
with some mid-range bal l i s tic missiles for deployment in Europe. Dur i ng 
this same period, the development of the century series (F-100, F-102, 
F-104, and F-105) fighter aircraft also took place . The most recent 
major weapons development, which is currently being placed into the 
military inventory at a rapid rate , is the Minuteman. It is anticipated 
that 800 Minuteman I missiles will be in place by June 1965. 1 Simultan-
eously , Minuteman II, an improved version, is being developed. 
Similarly, in the tactical area, funds are being expended on 
the development of the TFX (F-111) aircraft, the F- 4 aircraft, and on 
a Navy aircraft called the VAL. In the counterinsu rgency area, a devel-
opmental program is being established for a small aircraft capable of 
operating from unprepared surfaces in approxima t ely 300 feet. These are 
only a few examples among the host of other programs for advanced weapons 
systems which are currently being planned or already in being. 
There has been, in fact, in the past three years, between 1961 
and 1964, a substantial buildup in th e military strength of the United 
States. The major buildup has included : (a) A 100 percent increase in 
the number of nuclear weapons available to the strategic alert forces; 
(b ) a 45 percent increas e in the number of combat - ready Army divisions; 
(c) a 35 percent increase in tactical fighter squadrons; (d) a 60 percent 
increas e in the tactical nuclear forces deployed in Europe; a nd ( e ) a 
75 percent increase in air li ft capabili ty . 2 
1u.s. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Part 4, 
Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chi efs of Staff, 88th Gong., 2d 
Sess . (Wash ington, D. C., 1964), p . 30 . 
2Ibid ., p . 6 . 
3 
In addition to this buildup, constant improvements and modifica-
tions are being made in weapons which are already in the military inventory. 
As an example, the 1964 program for modifications considered necessary to 
improve the capability and to provid e for safety and materiel modifications 
of the B-52 fleet amounted to $272.2 mi ll ion, and $296.2 million was re-
quested for this same purpose for fiscal year 1965. 3 Similarly, the 
F-105 aircraft will r equire $20 million for modification during fiscal 
year 1965. 4 Further, most other in-place aircraft and missiles require 
the expenditure of funds for capability improvement as well as for reasons 
of safety. 
The Expenditures 
The development and the acquisition programs of major weapons 
along with their deployment and manning, as well as their modification 
and improvement programs and the required logistics support, has resulted 
in an ever-increasing military budget. The extent of these expenditures 
i s revealed in Table 1 . These ex penditures for military functions, as 
a percentage of the gross national product, have remained quite constant 
at about 9 percent since 1955, although they increased from $35.8 billion 
to $48 . 3 billion, a total of $13.5 billion, between 19 56 and 1963 . Fur-
ther increases have occurred since 1962, as the annual military expenditures 
for fiscal year 1965 are estimated at $51.2 billion, down from $52.3 for 
3u.s. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Part 3, 
Procurement, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (Washington, D.C. , 1964 ), p . 73. 
4l£!£., p . 67. 
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Table 1. Expenditures for Department of Defense military functions 
as a percentage of gross national product, fiscal years 
1939- 1963 (billions of dollars) 
Fiscal Gr oss nationa l De jz t. of Defense 
year product Expenditu r es Percent of GN P 
1939 88.2 1.1 1.2 
1940 95 . 7 1.5 1.6 
1941 110 . 5 6.0 5.4 
1942 140.5 23.6 16.8 
1943 178.4 62 . 7 35 . 1 
1944 202.8 75.8 37.4 
1945 218.3 80.0 36.7 
1946 202.8 42.0 20 . 7 
1947 223.3 13.8 6.2 
1948 246.6 10.9 4.4 
1949 261.6 11 . 6 4.4 
1950 263.8 11.9 4.5 
1951 310.8 19.8 6.4 
1952 338.8 38 . 9 11 . 5 
1953 359.7 43.6 12.1 
1954 362.0 40.3 11.1 
1955 377 .0 35.5 9.4 
1956 408.5 35.8 8.8 
1957 433.0 38.4 8.9 
1958 440.2 39.1 8.9 
1959 466.7 41.2 8.8 
1960 494.8 41.2 8.3 
1961 506.6 43.2 8.5 
1962 539. 4 46.8 8.7 
1963 568.3 48.3 8.5 
~: U.S . Congr ess, Subcommi t tee on Defense Procurement of the 
Joint Economic Committee, Background Materials on Economic Aspects of 
Military Procurement and Supjzly--1964, 88th Cong. , 2nd Sess. (Washing-
ton, D.C., 1963), p. 3. 
5 
fiscal year 1964.5 
The large expenditures for the defense programs of the United 
States are bound to have an important impact on the economy- -locally, 
nationally, and internationally. Locally and nationally , this effect 
is intensified by the uneven geographic distribution of defense- r elated 
industry and of mi litary activities, by the dispropor tionately large 
claims made by the defense program on some occupational specialties, 
and by the rapidly changing composition of the defense program as techno-
logical innovations create the need for new weapons and facilities and 
make obsolete the old . 
Internationa lly, the defense program has a significant impact on 
the continuing deficit of the United States ba l ance of payments. Since 
1958, Lhe deficit in the total balance of payments has averaged well over 
$3 billion annually. The gold stocks of the United States declined by 
almost $7.5 billion to a l evel of $15.6 billion, while liquid liabilities 
to foreigners (a substantial part of which represents a potential claim 
on the remaining gold stocks) rose by more than $9 billion to over $25 
billion. Al though defense expenditures are not the only, or even the 
primary, factor causing the i nternational deficit, they amounted to $18 
billion be tween 1958 and 1964, ave r aging a pproximately $3 billion a nnua lly . 6 
5u.s. Senate, Subcommittee on Depar t ment of Defense, of the Com-
mittee on Appropriations and the Committee on Armed Services, Department 
of Defense Appropriations, 1965, Part I, Procurement Programs Requiring 
Annual Authorization, Research, Deve l opment , Test , and Evaluation Programs, 
88th Gong . , 2d Sess . (Washington, D.C., 1964) , p . 6. 
6u . s . Senate Committee on Armed Services and the Subcommittee on 
De partment of Defense of the Committee on Appropriati ons , Military Procu r e-
ment Authoriza tions, Fi sca l Year 1965, 88th Gong ., 2d Sess . (Washington, 
D. C., 19 64 ), p. 28 . 
Nationa l security expenditures, by virtue of the fact that they 
are now so large and that th ey va r y in response to forces which are 
independent of economic conditions and policies, necessarily exe rcise 
6 
a limit i ng inf lu ence on the power of the federal government t o us e ex-
penditure policy for the purpose of promoting full employment or achiev-
ing economic stabi lity. 
Further, any attemp t to use defense expend itures as an instrument 
of fiscal policy to create a level of demand adequa te to keep the economy 
healthy and growing wou ld probably prove quite unwieldy and might also 
interfere with the attainment of a military posture consistent with the 
national policy. 
Becaus e expenditures for the national defense approximat e 50 per-
cent of the t otal nati onal budge t, a nd becaus e they have such a n impact 
on our society, it is necessary to examine the environment of weapons 
development and associated defense expendi tures and fully understand 
some of the major implications involved. 
The Pervasiveness 
Of course, th ere are more than expenditures and dollars involved, 
and the effects of defens e spending a r e all pervasive and affect all 
major activities in the United States. In an effort to provide an under-
standing of some of the major implications and effects of expenditures 
for the nati ona l defense th ere will be an examination of the following 
major areas: 
1. The environment of weapons development and the unique char-
acte r of the weapons market. 
2. The effect upon industry and its mode of doing business in 
a market in which the gpvernment is the sole buyer. 
3. The impact on geographical areas . 
4. The problems of small business in defense procurement. 
5. The implications of government-sponsored research and develop-
ment on scientific and engineering manpower for industry, higher education, 
and society at large. 
In order to gain an insight into the uncertainties involved in the 
development of majo r weapons sys tems, there will be an examination of the 
problems involved in accurately predicting the costs, development time, 
and the performance of these weapons. It is an extremely unpredictable 
business and the difficulties involved in accureately estimating the cap-
abilities of a potential enemy add even more uncertainty to the environ-
ment of weapons development. 
Because of the unpredictability involved and because the govern-
ment is truly a monopsonist in the weapons market, a unique set of 
government-industry relationships have been established which scarcely 
resemble the buyer-seller associations common to the ordinary market 
place. Exploring this area will provide the many reasons for these 
re l ationships. 
There will also be a review of the changes in the nature of 
modern weapons systems, i .e. from ordnance-type wheeled weapons and other 
conventional type weapons to missiles and to systems having great reliance 
on electronics. This change in the weapons product mix has resulted in 
major changes in the location of those industries providing weapons pro-
ducts to the government, with major consequences for those areas both 
gaining and l osing such industry. 
Also because of these changes in the nature of weapons systems, 
weapons contracts have had a tendency to be concentrated in the hands 
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of a relatively small number of large companies. This has in turn had 
major imp l ications on small business concerns and the number of govern-
ment contracts they receive . Aware of the possibilities of monopoly, 
major programs have been estab lished by the government to assure that 
small business receives an equitable share of expenditures for weapons 
products. 
In view of the large requirements for research and development 
in the weapons industry, there have been major consequences for industry, 
manpower, education, and a ll of society. Many developments resulting 
from military research have provided benefits to society at large through 
civilian application. However, there are many complaints that too much 
effort is being applied to military research and development to the 
detriment of economic progress in the civilian sector. 
The great requirements for scientific and engineering manpower 
for military research and development has had a major impact on education. 
Further, the amount of military research and development, along with 
other gove rnmenta l r esea rch, has had its effect on the universities. A 
searching analysis of this area will reveal the extent of these effects. 
Although not to be discussed, recognition must also be given to 
the fact that the research and development programs associated with modern 
weapons systems development has had great impact on automation, technology, 
science, and engineering, and the introduction of new product s and pro-
cesses . Further, it has had a large impact on the educational curriculum 
9 
for scientists, engineers, and technicians, which must respond to the 
changing technology being brought about by such research and develop-
ment. 
There will be no attempt to resolve the question of whether ex-
penditures for weapons systems or whether other mi l itary outlays are 
too great or too small; an answer to this question would require much 
more time and space than is normally allotted to a thesis. Further, 
it is doubtful that this question can even be answered. However, it 
is hoped that a thorough examination of the areas briefly discussed in 
the last several paragraphs will provide an insight into many of the 
ramifications of modern weapons systems development and some of its 
major effects on the American economy. This thesis also pr oposes to 
indicate, wherever appropriate , government react i on to the problems 
and pressures resulting from the development of modern weapons systems . 
10 
CHAPTER II 
THE BACKGROUND OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT 
Uncertainty of Weapons Deve lopment 
There has been a high degree of uncertainty in the development 
of modern weapons systems. Uncertainty in this context, is defined as 
the relative unpredictability of the outcome of a contemplated action 
and is not meant to reflect the state of mind of the decision-maker. 
The major uncertainties invo lved in the development of weapons systems 
in the 1950's and early 1960' s are rela ted to time, cost, and performance 
factors. Hajor development programs have often exceeded original cost 
estimates by 200 to 300 percent and schedules have been retarded from 
one to three years when compared with original predictions. These 
facts are well known to most government and industry managers who are 
concerned with weapons systems development. 
These uncertainties have been well documented. The major find-
ings of two major studies of this problem are discussed in the following 
paragraphs a nd sections . These stud i es were prepared by the Rand Corpor-
ation1 and by Peck and Scherer 2 in their 3- year research project on 
weapons acquisition. 
lA. W. Harshall and W. H. Heckling, Predictability of the Costs, 
Time and Success of Development, P-1821, Economics Division, The Rand 
Corporation, Santa Monica, California, October 1959. 
2Merton J. Peck and Frederic M. Scherer, The Weapons Acquisition 
Process : An Economic Analysis (Boston: Division of Research, Graduate 
School of Business Administration, Harvard Unive rsity, 1962). 
ll 
In their study of 12 weapons systems, Peck and Scherer considered 
three measures to ascertain the predictability or the unpredictability 
of the outcome of weapons prog rams . They were: (a) Development time, 
or the interval between the start of a program and the availability of 
operational weapons; (b) the costs development; and (c) quality, or the 
expected performance of the resulting weapon.3 To determine the pre-
dictability of these variables, a comparison of the initial predictions 
as documented in the pertinent contracts had to be compared with the 
actual time, cost, and quality outcomes. 
Some of the comparisons of time, cost, and quality outcomes with 
their initial predictions had to be viewed with reservation because of 
the problems involved in obtaining satisfactory data, for neither the 
original estimates nor the final ouLcomes were quite comparable between 
programs . The fact that initial predi ctions were often made at varying 
stages of progress of different weapons development programs presented 
a problem . In aircraft development programs, the development and produc-
tion of 5 to 15 prototypes had been sufficient to provide some reasonable 
indications of the total anticipated development costs. However, in many 
missile programs the entire research and development effort (including 
the production of initial prototypes) were not conta i ned in a single 
contract. Other factors causing difficulties in the comparison of pre-
dictions with actual outcomes were instances where only a specified 
"level of effort" was required for each year and where no total develop-
ment costs were specified. Sometimes, programs were submitted for planning 
purposes only and costs were deliberately understa t ed by contracto r s to 
3Ibid., p. 19. 
12 
"sell" the program. Conversely, the military proponents of a particular 
program submitted low cost and time estima tes to assure adoption of a 
particular program. Consequently, these estima tes could not be used as 
a basis of comparison with the final ou tcomes of time and cost.4 
A further problem encountered was the dete rmination of "initial 
operational capability," a term which cannot be precisely defined. Is 
the definition of this term applicable to the availability of a single 
operational missile or some larger number of missiles whose reliability 
is not exactly known? The answer to this question is not easy. Similarly, 
the determination of final costs are not easily determined because the 
extraction of precise costs from contractual documents may be made diffi-
cult by the inc lusion of joint costs, overhead, and the lumping together 
of production and development costs. In addition, the reorientation of 
programs numerous times for nontechnical reasons causes frustration of 
time, cost, and performance data. It was therefore necessary to intro-
duce some subjectivity to estimate 11original 11 predictions as well as 
"actual'' outcomes in assessing the cost, time, and quality data in their 
study of twelve major weapons systems development programs . This sub-
jective e l ement is ther efore prese nt in the prediction error data 
reflected in Table 2 . 
Despite th is subjectivity, the truth is that predictions have 
been quite inaccurate. As reflected in Table 2, it is not uncommon for 
final costs to have exceeded es timates by 200 to 300 percent . Further, 
development time appears to have exceeded original estimates by as high 
as 130 perce nt--the average being about 36 percent. 
4 Ibid. 
Table 2. Development cost a nd time variance factors in twelve 
weappns programs 
Program 
A 
B 
c 
D 
E 
F 
G 
H 
I 
J 
K 
L 
Average 
Development 
cos t factor8 
4.0 
3.5 
5 . 0 
2.0 
n.a. 
7.0 
3 . 0 
2.0 
2.4 
2.5 
. 7 
3.0 
3.2 
RAc t ual cost divided by origina l cost estimate. 
bActual time divided by original time estimate. 
Development 
time fact orb 
1.0 
2.3 
1.9 
n .a . 
. 7 
1.8 
1.3 
1.0 
1.3 
1.3 
1.0 
1. 4 
1.36 
l3 
Source: Merton J. Peck and Frederic M.Scherer, The Weapons Acqui-
sition Proces s : An Economic Analysis (Boston: Division of Research, 
Graduate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, 1962), 
p. 22. 
Peck and Scherer f ound it difficult t o compile a comparable set 
of fact or s t o those con t ai ned in Table 2 for performance outcomes of 
weapons developmen t programs because of the qualitative nature attached 
to these outcomes. Their ana lysis of some key performance characteristics, 
such as airspeed, range, al titude, and accuracy, for the twelve programs 
reflected in Table 2 va ried from . 80 t o 2.00. This indicated that actual 
performance fluctuated from approximately 100 percent above to about 20 
percent below wha t was originally predicted. Actual performance often 
exceeded original predictions and the central tendency was on the favor-
able side .5 
5rbid., p. 23. 
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To combine the results reflected in Table 2 pertaining to time 
and cost ou tcomes with those in th e previous paragraph related to per-
formance variables. it can be seen that errors are greatest for cost 
(only one program of the twelve cost less than estimated, while the 
average cost factor was 3.2), l ess for time (average time factor was 
1.36) and l east for performance. In weapons development great impor-
tance has usually been attached to meeting performance and time require-
ments. Cost, then, has traditionally been the factor with the greatest 
variability because by the use of additional funds, a development project 
could be made to meet or exceed performance and/or time objectives. This 
has l argely been r esponsible for the greater unpredictability of the cost 
dimension. 
The s t udy by Marshall and Meckling parallels the results con-
tained in th e Peck and Scherer study in many respects. In regard to 
costs, their study indicated that in the early stages of development, 
cost estimates were based on current design and the currently planned 
program for development. All costs are based on the proposed system and 
its components as presently conceived and aggregated. However, as 
develo pment progresses, the initial plans and designs may change. These 
c hanges may be du e t o unforeseen technical difficulties, or because the 
customer (military services) requires modifications to keep pace with 
the changing intelligence of military capabilities, new operational 
concepts, or new technological possibilities which require the addition 
of numerous components and devices not original l y planned for . The 
weight, form, and size may differ tremendously at the completion of the 
program. Another complicating factor is that the number of test articles 
15 
which may have initially been designated at fifteen may have gone up to 
forty- five by the end of the development program. Such changes have a 
great effect on costs and have occurred quite frequently. Consequently, 
the costs finally incurred were not the cost of the initial design or 
development plan, but the cost of what was finally pr oduced or the cost 
of whatever program was actually conducted. 6 
Any development program will have a basic uncertainty attached 
to it because of its nature. A greater variability will exist in the 
time, cost, and performance factors, the greater the technological 
advance being sought . For systems which demand many new ideas and major 
improvements, the errors in cost predictions have tended to be larger.7 
Marshall and Meckling ' s study shows that the cost variances were 
greater for missile programs which sought a higher order of advancement 
than they were for flighter and bomber programs. As shown in Table 3, 
the original estimates of the cost of production for four cargo and 
tanker programs showed an average factor of 1.2, or a variance of 20 
percent, against an average factor of 6.4 and 4.1 . This indicates var-
iances of 640 percent and 410 percent for the six missile programs which 
were studied. These two sets of factors (A and B) were prepared by two 
different individua l s. 
Peck and Scherer also indicated that numer ous external occurrences 
altered the course of developments programs with consequent effects on 
cost and time predictions . The major external causes are: Ad vances in 
technology, obsolescence, changing intelligence of enemy capabilities, 
~arshall and Meckling, p. 6. 
7Ibid ., p . 22. 
Table 3. Total factor increases in average cumulative cost of pro-
duction {adjusted) 
Cargoes 
Fighters Factors Bombers Factors and Factors Missiles 
A B _A ___ B_ tankers A B 
1 3.9 4.0 6.2 4.0 1.4 1.6 1 
2 2.6 2.5 2 2.8 2.8 2 1.5 1.5 2 
3 2. 0 2.0 3 1.1 1.2 3 1.0 .9 3 
4 1.5 1.5 4 1.0 .8 4 
5 1.7 2.1 5 
6 1.2 1.2 6 
7 1.0 . 8 
8 1.0 1.0 
9 1.1 .6 
Means 1.8 1.7 3.4 2.7 1.2 1.2 
Means- -a 11 classes A B 
3.2 2.4 
Factors 
A B 
14.7 6 .4 
9.4 6.0 
4.4 2.7 
7.2 7.1 
1.5 1.3 
1.1 .8 
6.4 4.1 
~: A. W. Marshall and W. H. Meckling, Predictabi lity of the 
Costs, Time, and Success of Development, P-18 21 , Economics Division, 
The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, Oc t ober 1959, p. 14. 
changes in defense policies, budget changes and fiscal reprogramming. 
and changes of key officials. 8 
16 
In summary, these two studies ref l ect the basic inability of the 
Department of Defense in the past to accurately estima t e and control 
cost, time, and performance outcomes of major development programs. 
The Department of Defense, however, recently has taken the view 
that something can be done to reduce many of the uncertainties involved 
in weapons systems development as reflected in the two studies which 
have been reviewed. The Department of Defense has indicated that poor 
planning, unrealis tic schedules, unnecessary design changes, and large 
8For a full discussion see Peck and Scherer, pp . 48- 52. 
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cost ove rruns have constantly disrupted the efficient conduct of develop-
ment programs . These difficulties have stemmed mainly from inadequate 
planning and unwarranted haste in starting large-scale development pro-
grams. Sometimes even production was a difficulty, particulary before 
a clear definition of what was wanted and before a clear determination 
was made of a technological basis on which to develop a system. Accord-
ingly, a discussion of the programs designed to overcome these deficiencies 
will follow.9 
The Need to Improve Planning 
In view of the inability of the military services to adequately 
predict and contro l time, cost, and performance factors, the Department 
of Defense has taken the view that the basic defects were related to in-
adequate planning and the identical treatment of all development work. 
The Department of Defense indicates that both government and 
industry have believed that planning for innovation and invention could 
not be accomplished. Forced to operate under tight delivery schedules, 
they have allocated large amounts of resources to projects without the 
firm assurance of success and without giving adequate thought to the 
best method to achieve stated goals. Contracts for operational hardware 
were l et before the feas ibility of accomplishing the bas ic technical 
requirements had been established. This type of planning was not con-
ducive to accurate pricing, and constant contingencies, changes, etc., 
prevailed throughout the live of the development. 10 
9u.s. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, 
Department of Defense Appropriati ons for 1964, HR-779, 88th Gong., lst 
Sess . (Washington, D. C. , 1963), pp. 73-74. 
10u .s. Department of Defense, Incentive Contracting Guide (Wash-
ington, D.C ., 1963), p. l. 
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Revising the Development Concept 
In view of the large expenditures involved in research and develop-
ment (mace than $6 billion in fiscal yea c 1963), 11 the need of the 
military services to have better control over their resources, and to 
enable better planning and control over time, cost, and performance 
factocs, the Department of Defense reorganized their concept of conducting 
development wack. 
Whereas in prior years development programs were treated as a 
single, bcoad category, now they are subdivided into six categories: 
"(1) research, ( 2) exploratory development, (3) advanced development, (4) 
engineering development, (5) management support , and (6) operational 
system development . " l2 A brief description of the various categories of 
development programs follows: 13 
(1) Research . Includes effects toward increased knowledge of 
natural phenomena and environment and efforts toward solving problems 
in the physical, behavioral, and social science that have no clear 
direct military application. 
(2) Expl ocatocy development . Aimed at solution of specific mili-
tacy problems , short of major developments. Includes studies, investiga-
tions and minor development efforts. 
(3) Advanced development. Aimed at development of hardware for 
llu .s. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Pr ocurement of the Joint 
Economic Committee, Background Materiel on Economic Aspects of Military 
Procurement and Supply, 1964 , 88th Gong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C., 
1964) , p. 27. 
12u . s . Department of Defense, Instruction 3200 . 6, Reporting of 
Research, Development and Engineecing Program Information {Washington, 
D.C., 1962), enclosure 3, pp . l-2. 
1~. 
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experimental or operational test. Items to be developed are for test 
or experimentation as opposed to items to be developed for service use. 
(4) Engineering development. Includes development programs to 
be engineered for service--but still not approved for production or 
operation. 
(5) Management and support. Includes R&D effort in support of 
installations or operations required for general R&D use. Included are 
such items as test ranges, military construction, maintenance support 
of laboratories and operations maintenance of test aircraft and ships. 
(6) Operational system development. Full effort toward develop-
ment, engineering and test of systems, support programs, vehicles and 
weapons that have been approved fo r production and use . 
The first four of these categories are phases in which an evo-
lutionary process takes place which translates ideas into useful military 
hardware. Each of the six phases above uses a different management tech-
nique. The first two phases of research and exploratory development 
generally do not prescribe goals, milestones, or schedules. Control of 
projects in these two categories is accomplished on a level-of-effort 
basis. 
A questioning in depth of the pot entia l military value of s pecific 
app lications and techniques takes place in the third s tate (advanced 
development) as ideas progress to the development of hardware for experi -
mental tests. At the same time, costs of the most promising applications 
are estimated to ascertain wh e ther the project, if fully developed and 
plac ed into production and service , would be worth the cost. 
During the fourth state (engineering development) when a system 
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is to be fully engineered for operational use, the necessary allocations 
of resources are made to the applicable project. Accordingly, before 
full-scale development is begun, operational requirements and cost effec-
tiveness of the system must be defined, and goals, milestones, and time 
requirements must be firmed up. At this point, a "project definition 
phase" is required.l4 
Project Definition 
The "project definition phase," is defined as "a formal step 
preceding full-scale development, during which preliminary engineering 
and contract and management planning are accomplished in an environment 
that encourages realism and objectivity. ,15 
The "project definition phase" unites under a single plan for the 
government and industry what is wanted, what the design will be, how it 
is to be built, when it is wanted, and the cost of the development. It 
describes the management techniques to be used for control of the develop-
ment. After this pl an has been completed, initiation of the management 
and support phase, and the operational systems development, follow as 
time progresses. 
The use of the "proj ect definition phase" would have to be unde r-
gone before any ''metal bending" was done. Thus, a more precise eva luation 
of all aspects of the new development prior to a major commi tmen t of 
14Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965 , Part 4, Secretary 
of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, p . 232. 
l5u.s. Department of Defense, Directive 3200.9, Project Definition 
Phase (Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 1. 
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resources is made possib l e. The number of costly projects can be 
reduced which might otherwise require subsequent reorientation, stretch-
ing out, or termination.l 6 
This approach recognizes that technological evo lution cannot be 
planned. Some of the research and development efforts in the ear l ier 
phases will not lead to any useful products and some unanticipated needs 
will be encountered along the way and some developme nt s will have to be 
culled out . Further, by the use of the first three pha ses as "building 
blocks" to define and manage large scale programs, there will be a tend-
ency to avoid costly and i nefficient crash programs and telescoped 
development-production efforts .l7 
This approach of precisely defining exactly what i s want ed, 
when it i s wanted, and how it will be controlled and managed is quit e 
different than the approach taken in the past as ref lected in the follow-
ing statement : 
Contracts . . . are necessarily cost-plus-a-fixed 
fee contrac t s , because no adequate basis exi sts for fixed 
price negotiations . ... We are demanding tomorrow what 
was unheard of yesterday and where t he passage be t ween the 
two is fi lled with unknowns, the costs of performance can-
not be est imated with r easonable accuracy.l8 
The use of "projected definition" is designed to over come the 
16u.s. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriat ions, Department of Defen se Appropriations for 1964, Part 1, 
88th Cong ., 1st Sess . (Washington, D.C ., 1963), p. 161. 
17Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Part 4, Secretary 
of Defens e, Chairman, Joint Chi e f s of Staf f, p. 232 . 
18u.s. Congress, Subcommittee on Def ense Procurement of the J oint 
Economic Commit tee, Impact of De fens e Procurement, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess . 
(Washington, D.C ., 19 60), p . 326 . Statement by Perkins McGuire, former 
Assistant Secretar y of Def ense (Supply Logistics) . 
problems indicated in the above quote. Its use in construction with 
incentive type contracts will be discussed later in the chapter. In 
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the next section there wil l be a discussion of cost -plus - fixed-fee type 
contracts, and the reasons for their widespread use in the pa st in major 
development programs. 
A Single Buyer: Monops ony 
There is but one ultimate consumer of advanced wea pons systems 
in this country- -the Unit ed States Government. This type of market is 
quite unlike the consumers market with which we are familiar. Although 
th e re are entrepre neurs in th e weapons business, the government o r buyer 
generally decides whether a new weapons system is required, the r e by taking 
the initiat i ve on new produc ts. In addition, by th e use of progress pay-
ments and the provision of government facilities and equi pment , develop-
mental outlays have been largely financed by the buyer . This precludes 
the sel l er from offering a fi nished product which the buyer can accep t 
or reject. Instead, development costs have been provided by the buyer 
before it is known what the ultimate performance or desirability of the 
product will be. The government ha s frequently changed, reduced , or 
cancel l ed the program before its comple t ion . Instead of a price determin-
a t ion by many buyers and sellers in the market, the price of the wea pon 
has been largely determined by cont ractor costs actually incurred, plus 
a fee bargained for in advance (cost plus f ixed f ee contracts). Furt her, 
these methods reduce the risks taken by the seller . These are the major 
factors which precl ude th e ex i stence of true market system in the weapons 
industry. 19 
19Peck and Scherer, p . 60. 
23 
The Administration of Weapons Systems Development 
Because of the lack of a true consumers market, the government has 
established an administrative substitute with a unique set of relationships 
between it and the weapons systems industry. This administration has pre-
dominantly taken the form of contracts known as cost - plus - fixed-fee in 
the past. Under this type of contract the corporation receives reimburse-
ment for all costs incurred in the development and production of weapons 
systems, plus a fixed fee which has been determined in advance . The major 
reason for using this type of contract has been the difficulty in speci-
fying exactly what is wanted in advance. This is in contrast to the type 
of contracting undertaken when a cont ract is· agreed upon for a specific 
product or task, as is commonly done in ordinary commercial practice. 
For the latter, it is entirely possible for compe tit ors to submit fixed 
price bids, and the buyer and seller will agree upon the product before 
it exists. Under the former, where there is uncertainty regarding the 
exact specifications of the end product, business is unable to assume 
the risk of bidding on a fixed price basis, and government does not 
expect industry to assume such risks. 
Since a fixed price and exact detailed specifications canno t be 
established in advance for enti r e weapons sys t ems and because of the 
large dollar amounts involved, the Military Services are placed into a 
direct, daily int imate relationship with the developers and producers 
of these systems . There is little doubt that the Services must, to a 
considerable extent, contro l component design and development since 
they are so critical t o the efficient performance of weapons systems. 
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The Services, rather than the contractor, know what performance character-
istics are critical under combat conditions. It is difficult to escape 
the conclusion that considerable direct contact between the Services and 
the producers of components and equipment for weapons systems is necessary. 
Weapons sys t ems development not only invo l ves considerable contact, 
but also obvious l y involves a great deal of control over individual con-
tractors by government procurement agencies. The Services frequently 
place constraints on management which are not customary in the private 
economy. Some of these stem from the insistence that they control per-
formance characteristics and, therefore, design. Some prime contracts 
specify not only what is to be supplied but how--with what materials, 
how much subcontrac ti ng, which subcontractors, and so on. The cost-p lus 
nature of these contract s requires the Services , prodded by the General 
Accounting Office (GAO), to see that all incurred costs are "legitimate." 
A contracting officer enforces rules designed to prevent waste or fraud, 
and approves or disapproves every items of expenditure by both prime 
contractor and subcontractors. He even controls (in theory) the wages 
and salaries to employees. This is somewha t r emoved from the term "free 
enterprise" as the term is usually und erstood , and as it is practiced 
elsewhere in the economy.20 
The monitorship of large contracts is achieved through the use of 
Air Force Plant Repres entative Offices. A typical office might have 8 
military pers onnel (officers ) and 142 civilian government employees; 27 
civilians in the Contract Division, 12 civilians in the Production 
20charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense 
in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 
p. 231. 
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Division, 74 civilians in Quality Control Division , 10 civilians in the 
Property Administration Division, etc. There may also be 10 civilian 
Air Force auditors in the office. 21 From the division tittles, it is 
obvious that costs, delivery schedules, quality performance, etc., are 
monitored very closely--intimately and constantly by government repre-
sentatives. The property function exists to monitor government industrial 
property and government-furnished parts purchased from other contractors, 
which are often pr ovided on large contracts. 
Industry, to a g reat extent, would like to have many of the con-
straints removed in their government contracts. But the Congress and 
the General Accounting Office, because of the huge expenditures involved, 
are constantly reviewing the Service ' s procurement practices, and through 
constant prodding the rules appear to be tightening. An idea of the 
magnitude of these expenditures may be gleaned from the following figures 
for only two weapons in the nation's arsenal. The amounts expended on 
the Atlas program to date are $3.9 billion, with f inal costs estimated 
at $5.2 billion, while the Minuteman estimate is $5.5 billion.22 
The public view regarding contractor surveillance is summarized 
as follows: 
The relaxation of con tractual restraints, whi l e highly desir-
able in itself, depends upon the development of satisfactory 
21u.S. House of Representatives, Subcommittee on the Committee 
on Appropriations, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1957, Pro-
curement Policies and Practices of the Department of Defense, 84th Cong., 
2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1946), p. 119 . 
22u.s. Senate, Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the 
Committee on Government Operations, Pyramiding of Profits and Costs in 
the Missile Procurement Program , Part 3 (Atlas Program), 87th Cong., 2nd 
Sess. (Washington, D.C . , 1962), p. 572. 
substitutes for "cost plus." Rightly or wrongly (we think 
rightly), the Congress and the public are determined that 
contractors be kept from cheating on cost-plus, even to 
the point of being willing to sacrifice some efficiency 
to prevent fraud ( or just excessive pocketlining).23 
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In regard to pocke t-lining, a maj or tool being used by Congress 
and the Services to ascertain the appropriateness of contract charges 
is the audit procedure. Congress, through the use of the General Account-
ing Office, has audited many contracts and disclosed numerous instances 
of overcharges by weapons contractors and subcontractors. A recent dis-
closure by this instrument of Congress asserted that Melpar Inc., which 
was deve loping a B-58 aircraft bomber recording system, charged the Air 
Force a price which exceeded incurred costs by $821,200, or 41 percent. 
This resulted in a detailed audit and negotiation of price adjustments 
between the Air Force and Melpar.24 
Routinely, the Services audit their contracts, and many audits 
result in re-negotiated prices and recovery of charges from contractors. 
In fiscal year 1962, the Air Force negotiated price reductions in the 
amount of $438 million as a result of 228 audits; in fiscal year 1963 
this total was $487 million for 250 audits. During these two years 
there were 10,809 contractors and subcontractor ' s cost estimates sub-
j ected to Air Force audit review.25 
In addition to the constraints of cost-reimbursement- type contracts 
upon industry, the following disadvantages to their use are summarized in 
this statement by the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installations and 
Logistics ) . 
23Hitch, p. 233. 
24Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Pa rt 3 , Procurement, 
p . 18 . 
25 Ibid ., p . 24. 
This t ype of contract has well-known disadvantages. 
It provides little or no incentive for private managers 
to reduce costs o r otherwise improve efficiency. Indeed , 
the cost-plus- fixed fee contract in combination with strong 
pressures from governmental managers to accomplish work on 
a rapid time schedule, probably provides incentives for 
raising rather than for reducing costs. If a corporation 
is judged in terms of whether it accomplishes a result by 
a given deadline rather than by whether it accomplishes 
that result at minimum cost, it will naturally pay less 
attention to costs and more attention to speed of accom-
plishment. On the other hand, where there is no given 
deadline and cost-plus-fixed - fee contrac t, it may serve 
to prolong the research and development work and induce the 
contractor to delay completion.26 
Incentive Contracts 
Due to the widespread dissatisfaction with cost-plus-fixed-fee 
contracts, the Department of Defense ha s been promoting the use of 
incentive-type con tracts . The incentive principle holds, in brief, 
that a contractor should be motivated, in calculable monetary terms: 
(l) To turn out a product that meets significantly 
advanced performance goals, (2) to improve on the contract 
schedule up to and including final delivery, (3) to sub-
stantially reduce the costs of the work, or (4) to complete 
the project under a weighted combination of some or all of 
these objec tives.27 
If the government can precisely define its objectives require-
ments, time tables and management controls through the application of 
27 
"project definition, '' it will probably enab l e the greater use of incent i ve-
type contracts. By taking the time to closely plan all facets of a develop-
ment project, the ability to establish realistic targets for use 
26u.s. House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Government Operations, Systems Development and Management, Part 2, 87th 
Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washington, D.C. 1962), p. 551 . 
27Incentive Contracting Guide, p. 1. 
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with incentive-type contracts shou ld be improved. In addition, the 
Department of Defense has begun to implement o ther management controls 
and are making them an integral part of contracts which must be defined 
and spelled out during the "project definition " phase. These techniques 
along with a precise definition of goals and targets should help improve 
the predictabi lit y of the cost, time, and performance factors which have 
caused major problems in the past. 
In essence, nearly all incentives take the form of a sharing 
arrangement, expressed as a percentage ratio. As an example, if a 
60/40 cost sharing arrangement was agreed upon, the government would pay 
60 cents and the contractor 40 cents of every dollar by which actual 
costs increased. Conversely, for every dollar saved , the governme nt 
would retain 60 cents, and the contractor ' s profit {or fee ) would in-
crease by 40 cents . In other words, over the range of costs where the 
sharing formula is applicable, the contractor mus t look at every do llar 
he spends as though 40 cents were his . His profits are thus tuned to 
the contractor over a variable on whi ch his management skills can have 
a significant effect. Ince ntiv e patterns may also be established for 
equipment performance as well; specific standards must be established 
for these performance goa l s a l ong with predetermined t es t procedures. 
The incentive targets can be tied into such characteris ti cs as speed , 
range, payload, or maneuverability. Delivery incentives may be related 
t o end-item delivery, test completions, or possibly only the acceptance 
of the first prototype.28 
There are t wo basic t ypes of incentive contracts . They are known 
28 Ibid., p . 10. 
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as the fixed-price-incentive-firm contract and the cost - plus-incentive-
fee contract. Under the first type of contract, the gove rnment and the 
contractor must negotiate four basic elements. These are: 
l. Target cost (against which to measure final costs). 
2. Target profit (a reasonable profit for the work at 
target cost). 
3. Ceiling price (th e total dollar amount for which the 
government is liable). 
4. Sharing formula (the arrangement for establishing final 
profit and price).29 
Upon completion of the work, the contractor and the government negotiate 
the final costs, sharing the overruns or underruns based on th e agreed -
upon formula. To illustrate, assume that the target cost is $100,000, 
the target profit $10,000, the pric e ceiling $118,000, and th e sharing 
formula is 75 percent for the government and 25 percent for the contractor. 
Under this formula, the contractor would keep 25 percent of every dollar 
saved. In order to earn a profit of $12,000, he wou ld have to reduce 
costs by $8,000 below target, or down to $92,000. Since there is no 
profit ceiling, profits cou ld increase indefinitely as the dollar under-
run increased. Conversely, a n overrun of $8,000 above target cost would 
reduce his profit to $8,000. With an overrun of $18,000 he would los e 
money, since this t ype contract does not provide for a mi nimum profit. 
Regardless of final contractor cost, the gove rnment's liability cannot 
exceed $118 ,000, and the contractual specifications must be met. 
The cost-p lus-incentive- fee contract uses the same type of sharing 
formu la as the fixed-price-incentive-firm contract. The formula determines 
the fee payable to the cont r actor on the basis of the r elation between 
29Ib id., p . 11. 
30 
target costs and total allowable costs. In contrast to the fixed-price-
incentive-firm contract, where no floor or ceiling profit is negotiated, 
this type contract states the minimum and maximum fees allowable. In 
development contracts, the maximum is limited to 15 percent of the target 
cost and on production contracts it is limited to 10 percent. In this 
type contract, the sharing formula may be expected to vary greatly, 
depending on the degree of confidence the government has in its estimate 
of costs versus the degree of confidence the contractor has in its estim-
ate. This may make the range of costs over which the incentive provisions 
operate quite extensive.30 
In most large development contracts the incentive will not only 
embody cost, but performance and schedule incentives as well. The pur-
pose of combining these incentives is fairly obvious . A satisfactory 
product or service is desired at a reasonable cost and within certain 
time limits. 
There has been a dramatic increase in the use of incentive-type 
contracts since 1961. Between 1955 and 1961, the use of cost-plus - fixed-
fee contracts increased from 19.7 to 38 percent of the total contract 
awards. However, between 1961 and 1963, this percentage decreased t o 
20 . 7 percent. A goa l of 12.3 percent has been es t abl i shed for fiscal 
year 1965, with cost-plus-fixed fee contracts to be awarded only for 
exploratory and research study projects.31 
A major cause of cost overruns on major development programs has 
been attributed to the widespread use of cost- plus- fixed - fee contracts. 
30rb id . , P. 12. 
31Department of Defense Appropriations for 1965, Part 4 , Secretary 
of Defense, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, p. 278. 
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The use of these contracts resulted in a lack of detailed advance plan-
ning which is a requisite for the close pricing of contracts and the 
close supervision of contractor performance. The open- ended arrange-
ment of reimbursable-type contracts also encouraged the premature 
initiation of development proj ec ts. This provided no incentive to 
the Services to define precisely in terms of performance characteristics, 
delivery dates, and costs what was to be procured.3 2 
The use of incentives has not only resulted in more adequate 
definition of the end product, but has also reduced costs considerably. 
"And for each contract dollar we shift from cost plus to fixed price or 
price i ncentive our evidence shows we have saved about ten cents and we 
have shifted something on the order of $4 billion per year so far . .,33 
A Wea pons Systems Development Program 
The Secretary of Defense indicates the extent of surveillance 
and control the Services maintain ove r contractors in the development 
of major weapons systems in the following statement: 
.. use of performance and evaluation review techniques 
(PERT) which identify the thousands of important events or 
dec ision points which must be monitored continuously both 
by Department of Defense and its contractors during the 
course of a major deve l opment project. In the Titan III 
pr ogram, for example, biweekly r epo rt s are received from the 
prime systems contractor on 2,500 key even ts indica t ing cost 
and time progress.34 
The following account of the Minuteman program will reveal in 
3 2Ibid. 
33Ibid ., p. 278. Statement by the Secretary of Defense McNamara. 
34Ibid .• p . 279 . 
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greater detail the extent of the relationshi ps betwee n government and 
industry, and the control the Services exercise over a major ~eapons 
deve l opment program. 
The primary agent for the governmen t in its contacts with indus try 
in th e Minuteman program is the United States Air For ce, through the Air 
Force Systems Command (AFSC) a nd the Air Force Logis tics Command (AFLC) . 
Air Force regulations describe their missions res pectively as fo llows : 
Th e ove ral l mission of the Air Force Systems Comma nd is t o 
advance aerospace technology, adapt it into ope rat iona l aero-
space systems , and acquire quali tative l y superior aerospace 
systems and material needed to accomplish the Air Force 
mission.35 Th e ove r a ll missi on of the AFLC i s to provide 
logis tic support and services for USAF organizations and 
systems and materia t . 36 
AFSC is r es pons ible for the initial research and deve l opment and 
making the weapon systems operational fo r use by the Air Force. AFLC is 
respons ible for l ogistic su pport, modifications, and improvements in th e 
systems after operational capability has been achieved. These responsi-
bilities place these two Air Force commands into a daily, intimate 
re lati onshi p with t he aerospace indust ry. The Armed Services Procurement 
Regu lations and the Air Force Procuremen t Instructions set up the basic 
rules for this r e latio nshi p. 
The Minuteman program is managed by the Ballistic Systems Divi sion 
(BSD) of the Air Force Systems Command Techno l ogy Laboratories (STL), a 
non-profit subsidiary of Thompson Ramo Wo oldridge Corporation . The 
35Department of the Air Force Regulation 23-8, Organization and 
Mission--Field, Air Force Sy s t ems Command (Washington, D.C . 1962), p. 1 . 
36Department of th e Air Force Regulation 23-2, Organizat ion and 
Mission--Fi e ld, Air Forc e Logistics Command (Washington, D.C ., 1962), 
p. 1. 
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Ballistic Systems Division is the executive agent res ponsible for accom-
plishment of all phases of the development program-design and manufacture 
of the missile--all it s ground equ i pment, design and const ructi on of 
development and opera tional system facilities, a nd provision of l og i s tics 
support and trained personne l to opera te and maintain the system. Fur-
ther, it provides overall pr ogram planning, direction, control and 
business management, includi ng the formal contracting function and 
logistic support. The Space Technology Laboratory provides systems 
engineering design coordination and technical direction.37 
The Boeing Corporation, one of several associate contractors in 
the Minuteman research and development program, is primarily responsible 
for weapon system integra ti on and prov id es for design integration, physical 
i ntegration of subsystems, and the testing out of the total weapon system. 
Add i ti onally, Boeing is res ponsible for the development of the launch and 
controls systems. Each of the other associate contractors is res ponsible 
for th e development of the other major subsystems. Boeing and the other 
associate con t ractors have a number of first-tier subcontractors to 
develop various components and to furnish e quipment, materials, a nd 
services of various kinds. Additional l y, the subcontractors a re su p-
port ed by second- and third-ti e r subcontractors according to the require-
ment s of th e deve lopment program .38 
BSD, assisted by STL, retains cont rol of the program and coordin-
at es all basic technical des i gns. This gr oup constantly evalua t es a ll 
37u .S . House of Representatives, Subcommittee for Special Inves ti-
gations of the Committ ee on Armed Services, Weapons System Management and 
Team Sys tem Concept in Government Contracting, 86th Cong . , lst Sess . 
(Washington, D.C . , 1959), p. 208. 
3Brb id . , P. 209. 
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factors affecting optimization of weapon systems design a nd constantly 
reviews design and development programs of all the associate contractors. 
Boeing, as the assembly and test contractor, is required to maintain 
close continuous coordination with the BSD/STL group. The initial plan 
was developed by the Air Force complex and forwarded to the associate 
contractors, to be used as a guide in working out their respective 
detailed plans. The associate contractor plans were then submitted t o 
the Air Force where they were integrated into an overall master plan, 
which upon release became the basic authority and direction for imple-
mentation of the contract. Key dates were established for use as targets 
and as a basis for measuring progress. The plan is a management tool 
for the Air Force and guidance for the contractors. The progress is 
monitored and compared with milestones in the master program plan . 39 
Regu lar technical directive (TO) meetings, chaired by STL, are 
held to frequently reviewed program status, progress, and problem areas 
with all associate contractors. The minutes from these meetings and 
other STL instructions become technical directives and are processed 
to become legal amendments to the prime contract . By means of these 
meetings, progress is monitored and technical direction is provided . 
Close relationships and continuing coordination is achieved. The system 
is designed to shorten lines of communication and facilitate prompt 
decision making. Complete control of subcontracting is retained by the 
contracting agency, BSD, and all direct contract charges and overhead 
expenses ar e audited by Air Force inspection personnel who are resident 
at the contractor's plant as standard routine procedure .40 
39Ibid. 
40Ibid. 
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The competition in obtaining such a contract is keen. The manner 
in which Boeing obtained this contract follows: A preproposal briefing 
was held at which 22 companies were represented. Companies present were 
in no position to know how many companies were sent the request for pro-
posal, although it was reasonable to assume that the request for proposal 
was sent to more firms than those present. Eleven companies responded to 
the request for proposal. These companies included a substantial segment 
of American industry--General Motors, Bendix Aviation, Douglas Aircraft, 
General Electric, Martin, Boeing, Chrysler, Convair, McDonnell, North 
American Aviation, and Northrop.4l 
After the written prop osa ls were submitted and evaluated, each 
prime contractor was invit ed to brief the Air Force Proposal Board on 
his proposal. The Board was made up of e ight Air Force officers and two 
government civilian emp l oyees . Organizations represented on the Board 
were: The Air Force Systems Command, the Air Force Logistics Command, 
the SAC (Strategic Air Command, potential user). After about five weeks 
of study, Boeing was informed they had been awarded the assembly and test 
contract. Boeing then worked with the Air Force in developing proposed 
statements of work fo r subcontractors. It was then Boeing's task to 
integrate the assoc iate subcontractor system into a workable overa ll 
system acceptable to the Air Force.42 
The following statement by Major General Sam Phillips, former 
director of the Minuteman program, indicates some of the relationships 
es tablish ed between industry and government as well as those corporations 
4 1rhid., p. 211. 
4 2Ibid. 
having responsibility for the major subsystems: 
Our approach now, is for the Ballistic Systems Division 
(BSD) Program Office to be responsible for system manage-
ment. We have contracted with STL to do our systems engin-
eering and technical direction of our associate contractors. 
The STL military project teamworks closely together here 
in Inglewood to direct and coordinate the activities of 
our six prime associate contractors plus certain other prime 
contractors such as the architect engineer. Boeing is re-
sponsible for systems test operation, for physical integra-
tion of the system, for assembly and checkout in the field . 
Autonetics has the guidance and control system, and the 
ground support equipment uniquely associated with guidance 
and control. Thiokol has the first stage engine, Aerojet 
the second, and Hercules Powd e r the third stage. Avco has 
the re-entry unique to the handling and check-vehicle, 
plus such ground equipment out of the re-entry vehicle with 
its warhead. Parsons Company is the architect engineer.43 
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There is little doubt that the development of major weapons systems 
is a complex project which requires a great deal of centralized planning 
and control. It is for this reason that the government -contractor relation-
ship cannot be the same as the typical buyer-seller relationship. Further, 
the uncertainties involved and the high costs of development further indi-
cate the need for close surveillance and control. 
The recent changes effected by the Department of Defense in its 
concept of research and development, with the application of "project 
definition" assure the continuance of close survei llance and control over 
contractors participating in development programs. It i s, therefore, un-
like l y that the const raint s placed on the weapons industry will be relaxed 
in the foreseeable future. 
43Philip Geddes, "1-linuteman 1-!anagement, The View from the Top," 
Aerospace 1-lanagement , Hay, 1962, p . 28. 
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CHAPTER III 
IMPACT ON GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS 
The Background 
Economic changes in specific geographical areas are subject to 
various forces. Techno l ogy creates new demands--both product and service--
and displaces old ones. Specialized resources attract people, business, 
and industry. Major governmental decisions, local, state, and national, 
encourage or stifle economic growth. The population increases, its in-
come grows and it improves it s skills; or perhaps there is a decline in 
all these as people leave seeking be tter economic alternatives. Initia-
tive on the part of l ocal promotional groups may attract activities that 
represent net additions to the national product or mere relocations from 
other l ess favored areas . 1 
Small geographical areas have a common economic feature. In 
addition to the response to the broad general forces of development and 
fluctuation, these areas are more often than not peculiarly subject to 
stimuli or s lowdown by outside forces. Growth or decline in their 
economies are likely to be a somewhat errat ic and typically unbalanced 
response to global, national, regional, and state patterns of which it 
is a minute and often specialized subpart.2 Economic responses such as 
these have resulted from the development of modern weapons systems. 
1c. P. Blair, Economic Growth Projections for the Dallas, Fort 
Worth, and Houston Trading Areas (Austin: Bureau of Business Research, 
The University of Texas, 1961), p. l. 
2rbid. 
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Effects such as those described above have been felt in individual com-
munities and regions throughout the United States as a result of federal 
contracts for defense purposes, since the development and production of 
weapons is by far the largest single element of government s pendi ng . 
Effects of Reduced Military Expenditures 
The advanced weapons industry is also sufficiently large to have 
a substantial impact on the total economy as well. An illustration of 
this proposition is provided by events in 1957. In June 1957, a stretch-
out {reduction in the rate of activity) for many weapons projects combined 
with a r educed rate of progress payments (partial payments made in advance 
of delivery to defense contractors engaged in the execution of a weapons 
project) had a significant impact on the national economy. Thus, defense 
contractors were required to finance privately a greater share of their 
work in progress. Both these actions were taken to maintain Department 
of Defense expenditures at the planned figure of $38 bi ll ion and to avoid 
additional government borrowing that would have necessitated an increase 
in the statutory limit on the federal debt.3 
These steps resulted in defense contractors reducing both their 
work week and their labor force . In turn, thi s reduced consumer income 
and spending. In addition to these direct effects, these governmental 
actions created uncertainty in industry and among consumers which may 
have influenced both business and consumer spending. 
While these actions did not precipitate the 1957 recession, it 
is generally agreed that they were contributing factors. In an article 
3see New Yo r k Times, June 2, June 23, and September 29, 1957, for 
a full discussion of these actions . 
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based on interviews with 165 business executives, including many whose 
firms had no defense contracts, ~ criticized the stretchout and 
cutbacks in defense spending. It was noted that these measures were 
placed into effect just as the economy was slowing down. Economica lly, 
this was considered bad timing as well as having an adverse impact on 
the U.S . defense posture at the time the race for outer space was begin-
ning.4 Further evidence of this was presented by Professor Samuelson 
who listed among the contributing causes of the recession, "the drop 
in 1957 defense spending. •6 
This example substantiates the fact that the economic health of 
the weapons industry has a substantial impact on the stability of the 
economy of which it is such a major part. The loca tion of the weapons 
system industry gives it a more vital role in this respect in many areas 
than its total size alone would indicate. Table 4 shows the distribu-
tion among the states for 1961 and 1962 defense procurement. These 
figures indicate that there is something for every state. Thus, the 
economic impact of fluctuations in spending for defense is diffused 
throughout the country and has a direct and immediate impact upon the 
economy of each locality.6 
4George B. Bookman, "How Top Businessmen View the Recession, " 
~' April 1958, p . 256. 
Su.s. Joint Economic Commit tee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, 
Hearings , Fiscal Policy Implications of the Cu r rent Economic Outlook, 
85th Cong., 2d Sess (Washington, D.C., 1948), p . 175. 
6peck and Scherer, p. 106 . 
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Table 4. Defense contract awards and estimated annual payrolls, by states , 
1961 and 1962a 
1961 1962 
Contract Estimated annual Contract Estimated annual 
State awardsb eaJ!r011 awardsb EaJ!r011 
Military Civil- Military Civil-
personnelC iansd personnel c iansd 
Total 24,305 6,057 5,592 27,800 6,948 5,828 
Alabama 105 86 210 154 97 215 
Alaska 92 124 45 63 129 45 
Arizona 245 77 44 153 79 45 
Arkansas 46 39 19 85 78 27 
California 5,277 758 839 5,993 843 867 
Colorado 466 117 84 565 159 89 
Connecticut 1,018 22 15 l, 213 18 16 
Delaware 71 34 47 35 
District of 
Columbia 150 69 176 182 69 172 
Florida 493 235 140 645 246 145 
Georgia 301 256 188 337 332 201 
Hawaii 27 138 128 32 153 132 
Idaho 14 23 3 26 25 3 
Illinois 437 184 162 531 194 179 
Indiana 353 34 62 637 47 70 
Iowa 127 5 5 179 6 3 
Kansas 539 138 32 394 158 34 
Kentucky 46 159 71 44 200 75 
Louisiana 139 77 34 244 161 45 
Maine 97 67 11 80 62 10 
Maryland 528 184 218 469 219 231 
Massachusetts 1,072 146 158 1,310 150 161 
Michigan 590 86 66 678 94 65 
Minnesota 189 20 11 297 25 11 
Mississippi 69 112 33 100 130 34 
Missouri 338 102 83 546 133 88 
Montana 95 38 31 38 7 
Table 4 (continued) 41 
1961 1962 
Contract Estimated annua 1 Contract Estimated annual 
State awardsb Ea~ro11 awardsb Ea:tro11 
Military Civil- Military Civil-
personnelC iansd personnelC iansd 
Nebraska 51 73 26 53 81 26 
Nevada 9 38 17 8 36 17 
New Hampshire 105 36 62 59 40 62 
New Jersey 950 144 164 1,063 181 161 
New Mexico 64 88 68 61 94 69 
New York 2,643 151 303 2,669 165 314 
North Carolina 237 260 60 269 324 62 
North Dakota 13 35 4 100 43 7 
Ohio 1,004 83 218 1,063 88 232 
Oklahoma 123 119 143 136 142 154 
Oregon 28 20 22 46 21 21 
Pennsylvania 804 55 399 952 57 417 
Rhode Island 25 22 50 58 30 50 
South Carolina 41 162 86 65 1.80 90 
South Dakota 28 21 10 113 23 11 
Tennessee 144 68 39 184 73 40 
Texas 1,138 706 340 1,006 779 362 
Utah 350 15 104 299 17 116 
Vermont 16 2 1 16 2 
Virginia 505 322 466 446 348 477 
Washingt on 646 190 139 921 251 140 
West Virginia 19 2 5 134 2 5 
Wi sconsin 222 18 11 259 18 13 
Wyoming 24 15 4 23 17 4 
Undistributed 2,192 82 2,762 67 
arn millions of dollars. For years ending June 30. Data for contracts 
refer to awards made in fiscal year specified ; expenditures relating to 
those awards may extend over severa l years . 
bAwards of $10,000 or more for supplies, services, and construction. Figures 
reflect prime-contract awards and therefore do not show the effec t of sub-
contracting on state distribution of defense work. 
CFor shore- based personnel only. 
dDirect hire on l y . 
Source : Department of Defense, Office of the Secre t ary. Reproduced f r om 
~ureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1963 
(Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 260. 
Geographic Concentration of Spending 
for Weapons Systems 
However, the geographic concentration of weapons spending is of 
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greater importance than its dispersion--in terms of direct economic con-
sequences. In fiscal year 1962, defense companies in 10 states received 
65.7 percent of the prime contract awards, while firms in California 
alone received almost 24 percent.7 Further, California firms are primar-
ily concentrated in the Los Angeles-San Diego area, consisting of these 
two counties plus Imperial, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, Santa 
Barbara, and Ventura. The three defense industries (aircraft, electronics, 
and ordnance) account for 39 percent of the manufacturing employment in 
the Los Angeles area. 8 Add to this the businesses in other industries 
supporting the defense industry along with the proportion of goods and 
services purchased by defense employees and the effect is what is known 
as "California ' s Precarious One-Crop Economy."9 
An estimate of direct defense employment in manufacturing in south-
ern California indicated a total of 360,000. If these figures are comparable 
to total U.S. employment in missiles and aircraft of 977,900 in October 1959, 
as calculated by the U.S. Department of Labor, then southern California had 
at that time approxima t ely one-third of all worke rs in the industry. 10 
7u.S. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint 
Economic Committee, Background Material on Economic Aspects of Military 
Procu r ement and Supply, 88th Cong., lst Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p.8. 
~aurice J. Gershenson, "Shifts in California's Industrial and Employ-
ment Composition," Monthly Labor Review, May 1959, p. 513. 
9seyom Brown, "Southern California's Precarious One-Crop Economy," 
The Reporter , January 7, 1960 , p. 25. 
lOGeorge A. Steiner, National Defense and Sou thern California (Los 
Angeles: Southern California Associates of the Committee for Economic 
Development, 1961), p. 84. 
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The consequences of such a concentration can have major economic 
impact on an area or community. The downward trend in several major 
weapons programs in 1961 and 1962 has created unemployment problems for 
many employees, plants, and communities. Examples of thes e are the B-52, 
B-58, BOMARC , HOUND DOG, SKYBOLT, ATLAS, BMEWS, and other programs.ll 
On the other hand, southern California has also experienced prob-
lems with the explosive growth of defense installations. Lompoc grew in 
three years from a community of approximately 5,250 to almost 15,000 
because of the establishment o.f Vandenberg Air Force Base and the Point 
Arguello Naval Missile Facility . l2 
The city of San Diego is a prime example of what may happen to 
an area with a heavy concentration of defense spending, when many of 
these contracts are withdrawn. In 19 61, aircraft missile employment 
and goverrunent wages made up 44 percent of the San Diego civilian payroll . 13 
During World War II, San Diego became one of the nation ' s largest aircraft 
producers, as well as being the site of the San Diego Naval Base. Its 
population rose from 289,348 to 556,808 in 1950 and by 1960 it had soared 
to 1,033,011. It was considered the fastest-growing major city in the 
United States . As the years went by, the aircraft industry edged into 
the missile industry, but stayed mainly with airc raft production. In 
1950, the industry grossed $104,500,000; by 1960 the yearly figure was 
11u.s. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint 
Economic Committee, Hearings, Impact of Military Supply and Service Activi-
ties on the Economy, 88th Gong ., lst Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 60. 
l 2steiner, p . 107. 
lJ"How San Diego Got Trapped," Business Week, December 8, 1962, 
p. 127 
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over $1 billion. Then the Air Force stopped buying Convair's F-102 and 
F-106 airplanes. In 1961, San Diego's industry took in a bare $215 
million on planes and missiles.l4 
As a result of the shift from aircraft to missiles, employment 
dropped steadily and San Diego's unemployment grew to 8.8 percent and 
was likely to grow higher, for Convair's liquid-fueled Atlas was gradually 
being phased out in favor of the solid-fueled Minuteman. 15 
Concentration of Research and Development 
Fifty-eight percent of all monies spent on missiles and 25 percent 
of all expenditures for electronics in fiscal year 1961 were for research, 
development, test, and evaluation work. There has been a strong tendency 
toward concentration of such contracts in California and in the coastal 
strip from Boston, Massachusets, to Washington, D. C. Also benefiting 
have been certain Mountain and Southern states . 16 
Department of Defense contracts awarded for research and develop-
ment in fiscal year 1962 totalled over $6 billion, which was almost one-
fourth of all prime contract awards during that year. Further, the awards 
for the procurement of research and development is in a strongly rising 
trend . 17 
14"Bust Town7" Newsweek, August 17, 1962, p. 20. 
I5rbid. 
16u.s. Senate Select Committee on Small Business, Impact of Defense 
Spending on Labor Surplus Areas--1962, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess. (Washi ngton, 
D.C., 1962), p . 171. 
17u.s. Congress, Subcommittee on Def ense Procurement of the Joint 
Economic Committee, Background Material on Economic As pects of Military 
Procu r ement and Sup pl y, 88th Cong . , 1st Sess. , (Wa shing t on, D.C., 1962), 
p. 41. 
These contracts are more closely concentrated in a few states 
than the remaining three-fourths of defense procurement. In fiscal 
year 1962, these were the 12 leading states performing 88.5 percent 
of all the research, development test, and evaluation work. 18 
Percent Percent 
California 39.2 Colorado 3.75 
New York 10.87 Florida 3.78 
Washington 8.06 Maryland 3.12 
Massachusetts 5.92 Ohio 2.17 
New Jersey 4.80 Utah 1.95 
Pennsylvania 3 .86 Connecticut 1 .06 
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The remaining 11.5 percent of the total research effort was con-
tracted with business and non-profit firms in the remaining 38 states . 
It is noteworthy that California and the Eastern Seaboard states, between 
them performed almost three-fourths of all military research and develop-
ment during fiscal year 1962. This is highly significant, because a firm 
which has conducted or managed the research, design, development, and 
test work on a new weapon system or a major component thereof, and has 
assembled the engineering talent and experience for this purpose, obviously 
has a great advantage in competing for the follow-on production contracts 
and for new developmental contracts as well . It is logical, then, that 
production contracts for newly developed items, figuring heavily i n fut ure 
federal procurement, have a tendency to be placed where the research, 
development, test, and evaluation effort has been centered. About these 
awards: '~any people believe them to be the seed corn variety, which later 
leads to even larger production contracts. 1120 
18u.s. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, Thirteenth Annual 
Report, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 40. 
19Thirteenth Annual Report, p. 71. 
20sackground Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement 
and Supply, p. 40. 
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The Procurement Mix of the Weapons Industry 
There is no one clearly identifiable product which is produced by 
the weapons industry. These products are partly defined by their use, 
which may be for the potential destruction of an enemy or for defense 
of the country against destruction by such an enemy and also partly by 
their advanced technical characteristics. The relative importance of 
various types of weapons meeting these requirements has changed radically 
in the past 20 years . 21 
Missiles have increased greatly in importance- -sp ending for 
missiles has risen from 0.5 percent in 1953 to about 33.6 percent of 
al l hard goods purchased for defense in 1961. 22 
Expenditures for aircraft have remained relatively constant 
between 1953 and 1961 . Aircraft spending was at 31.5 percent of fiscal 
year 1953 deliveries, and at 28.2 percent of the total fiscal year 1961 
procurement. 23 
It is in spending for ships and ordnance where there has been a 
great decline. Expenditures for ships were 26.2 percent of the hardware 
bill during World War II, and dropped to 6.8 percent in fiscal year 1953 
and was 7.8 percent in fiscal year 1961.24 
Ordnance (items such as tanks, othe r vehicles, weapons and ammuni-
tion) plus production, construction, and other commercial types of 
21Peck and Scherer, p. 107. 
22u.s. Senate, Subcommittee on Retailing, Distribution, and Market-
ing Practices, Report to the Select Committ ee on Small Business, Impact of 
Defense Spending on Labor-Surplus Areas, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. {Washington, 
D.C., 1963), p. 5. 
23Ibid. , p. 169. 
24Ibid. 
equipment and hardware constituted about 50 percent of the military 
hard goods bought in fiscal year 1953. By fiscal year 1961, these 
were only 12.4 percent of the total prime contract awards. In eight 
years, they had fallen from one-half to one-eighth of the total hard 
goods buy. 25 
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Significantly, expenditures for electronics in current weapons 
systems has increased tremendously--both in aircraft and in missiles. 
Authoritative estimates indicate that for fiscal year 1964, the elec-
tronics bill will be 30 percent of the research and development budget, 
25 percent of the aircraft budget, and 35 percent of the missile budget 
and $1.5 billion for "pure" electronics not assoc iat ed with aircraft 
and missiles. These expenditures will approximate $6.6 billion in fiscal 
year 1964. 26 Coupled with space expenditures of $2.3 billion for elec-
tronics (about $800 million for military purposes) the total is about $9 
billion for electronics.27 
The increase in expenditures for missiles and electronics and the 
decline in the spending for ordnance, ships, and to a limited extent for 
aircraft, has had a major impact on a large section of the economy. These 
changes in defense procurement have also caused some major geographic 
consequ ences . 
Geographic Shifts of Weapons Procurement 
The changes in the weapons systems product mix has caused maj or 
changes in the location of those industries providing weapons and weapons 
25Ibid. 
26
''Military Electronics Will Level Off In Fiscal 1964," Electronics, 
January 25, 1964, p . 18. 
27Ibid. 
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products t o the government . The greatest geograph i cal adjustments may 
be found in the heavy losses of the East North Central and Middle Atlantic 
areas and in the large gains of the West Coast and Mountain states. The 
Mountain and Pacific states which had 13.5 percent of prime World War II 
con tract awards, increased this shar e to 18.6 percent during the Kor ean 
conflict and to 32.6 percent in fiscal year 1961. The large incre~se in 
electronics and missile procurement are definitely related to these 
statistics. 28 
On the opposite side of the coin, we find that the s t ates of 
Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, and Wisconsin, combined, we r e awarded 21.9 per-
cent of the total defense contracts in World War II, 17 . 8 pe r cent during 
the Korean conflict, and onl y 9.1 percent in fiscal yea r 1961 . The East 
North Central a r ea defense contract awards dr opped from $8.7 billion 
during Korea to $2.6 billion in 1961. The loss of $6.1 billion pe r year 
in defense contracts can have severe economic impact and can mean hundreds 
of th ousands of j ob s . It is no surprise, th en, that many communities in 
these states have encounte red recur rent unemployment problems. During 
the World War II and Korean conflicts, these sta t es contributed heavily 
to the production of wheeled vehicles, weapons, ammunition, and equip-
ment items which made up a large portion of the defens e procurement bill, 
but which now form a relatively smaller share of defense requirements. 29 
The Middle Atlantic states , New York, Pennsylva nia , and New Jersey 
had a smaller share of defense awards in 1961 than during Korea, but the 
169. 
28rmpact of Defense Spending on Labor Surplus Areas--1962, p . 
29 I bi d. , p. 171. 
49 
losses were relatively less serious than for the Midwest. The gains 
in electronics and missiles for the plants of these states, balanced 
out against losses in the more traditional fields of procurement, par-
ticularly in the western section of New York.30 
The rapid rise in expenditures for missiles and electronics is 
also related to the higher share in fiscal year 1961 awards, compared 
with the Korean period to firms in Massachusetts, Texas, and Florida, 
as well as the plants in California and Colorado 3l 
The changing geography of American industry has had significant 
impact on the employment-unemployment picture in the United States. 
Since 1947, eight states had an employment growth which was double 
the national average. These were Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Utah. And one of the most dramatic indi -
cations of this changing geography is that one out of every six jobs in 
the United States is located in just three states- -California, Florida, 
and Texas. However, large industrial states like Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio increased their employment by less than the 
national average.32 
Preparation for Reduced or Shifting 
Defense Spending 
The relaxed tensions since the Cuban crisis, along with the nuclear 
test ban have brought hopes that peace and disarmament were possible to 
achieve over an extended period. In recognition of the possible economic 
30rbid. 
31I bid . 
32I bid., p. 26. 
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consequ ences, the Presi dent orde r ed the formation of a high-leve l gove r n-
ment committee to help him cope wi t h the impact of possible a r ms r eductions 
and shifts in defense spending. The President fea r ed that military spend-
ing changes could weake n the economy . The impact of a large reduction 
from the $1 billion a week expenditures for defense , whic h was about 
half of the entire $98 billion budget for fiscal yea r 1964, could be 
highly significant.33 The President s t ated in a memorandum: 
Federal ou tlays for defense a r e of such magnitude 
tha t they inevitably have major economic significance. In 
certain regions of the nati on and in certain c ommunities, 
they provide a significant share of t o t a l employment income. 
lt is th e refor e important that we improve our knowledge of the 
economic impacts of such spending, so appropriate action can 
be taken in coopera t ion wi th state and local governments , 
private industry, and lab o r t o minimize potentia l disturbances 
which may arise from cha nges in the leve l and patte r ns of 
defense outlays .34 
The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense fo r Arms Control expected 
visible progress coward a n Eas t-West Arms Control agreement i n the ensu ing 
year, and he urged defense contractors t o seek new markets as insurance 
against reduced military expenditures. He indicated that the demand for 
equipment for arms cont r ol inspection could not be expected to make up 
f or the amount of defense procurement reductions if an a rms agreement 
was reached.JS 
The r e is a difference of opin i on on how well the economy would 
bear up under a major r educti on in arms outlays. Some leading government 
officials are on record as saying an adjustment could be relatively smooth 
33New York Times, December 22, 1963, p . 1. 
34rbid. 
35New York Times, December 27, 1963, p . 3 . 
with proper planning. 36 The Deputy Secretary of Defense stated: 
There is no reason that the economic impact of defense 
programs, whether stemming from major budget shifts either 
up or down, or from the shifting pattern of procurement 
within a relatively limited budget--cannot be accommodated 
without serious disruption or distortion of our overall 
economic position.37 
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He stated fur ther that he hoped for a decline in defense spending, 
but that even if there was an increase in military spending, "there would 
still be continual changes in the pattern of procurement there 
would still be shif t s in installations and base closings, there would 
still be program cancellations and completions . . .. 38 These changes 
would have consequences for the geographical areas in which they occurred. 
Some private groups are less optimistic about the ability of the 
economy to withstand the impact of a severe drop in arms expenditures 
without causing grave trouble. The Stanford Research Institute would 
expect a monumental problem if there should occur any large shift in 
either the amount or the pattern of defense spending.39 
Some contractors are particularly vulnerable to reductions since 
they rely almos t completely on government business. Examples of such 
companies are Republic Aviation, McDonnell, Grumman, Lockheed, Avco, 
and North American . By contrast, other top defense contractors are 
broadly diversified and could withstand the impac t of a big cut in 
the defense budget without too much strain. Companies such as General 
36
"Shifts in Defens e Business," Financial World, January 1964, p. 3. 
3 7Katherine Johns en, "Effort Urged to Ease Effect of DOD Shifts," 
Aviati on Week and Space Technology, November 11, 1963, p. 31. 
38lbid. 
39"Shifts in Defense Business," p. 3. 
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General Electric, whose $1 billion worth of business with the government 
accounts for only 20 percent of its total yearly volume and American 
Telephone and Telegraph whose one-half billion dollars worth of govern-
ment business accounts for only 3 percent of its yearly volume, would 
have no great difficulties. However, the average defense contractor 
does not enjoy such diverisification, and a large reducti on in defense 
business could have serious economic consequences on such a firm and 
the community in which it is located.40 
A Senate Subcommittee on manpower and employment as well as an 
inter-agency group under the President's Council of Economic Advisors 
began to study the effect of the military program on t he over-all 
economic growth, and the adaptability of the defense industry to shifts 
in military requirements or disarmament. These groups considered the 
cutbacks resulting from changing military requirements or from possible 
disarmament as the same basic prob lem. Cutbacks hitting hard at one 
defense firm and one con:nnunity are being called "little disarmaments. 11 
11To the people involved, these are the same as disarmament.••4l 
These committees were to establish the organizational machinery 
and policies t o meet the disrupti ons of these "l ittle disarmaments. 11 
By so doing, there wou ld be preparation to adjust smoothly to changes 
that might be required by any general disarmament step. 42 
The size of the weapons industry, its widespread dispersion 
40Ibid. 
4 1Katherine J ohnsen, "Economic Impact of Defense Shifts Eyed, " 
Av iati.on Week and Space Technology, September 30, 1963, p. 28. Statement 
by Archib ald S. Alexander, Chief of the Economic Bureau of the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. 
42 Ib id. 
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throughout the states, along with its heavy concentration in specific 
areas and its crucial importance to these areas, means that changes to 
the weapons acquisition process have widespread economic consequences . 
As a result, there will also be some political pressures upon weapons 
development and production decisions, for there is too much at s t ake 
in the purchase of modern weapons to allow this to be a private affair 
between the services and their contractors.43 
Political Implications of Defense Spending 
The distribution and award of government contracts are of great 
concern to those who are elected to look after the interests of the 
states, districts, municipalities, etc. Since the development and pro-
duction of weapons is by far the largest single element of government 
spending, political variables are obviously reflected in the weapons 
acquisition equation . Political pressures are apt to arise in connection 
with the selection of firms to conduct new weapons programs and with the 
cancellation of going programs.44 
These pressures are also related to the geographic shifts of 
weapons procurement previously discussed. Senator Javits of New York 
introduced a bill in 1959 that required procuring agencies to consider 
"the strategic and economic desirability of allocating purchases to 
different geographic areas of the Nation."45 This action was viewed by 
the West Coast as an attempt by Easterners to reverse the rising trend 
of West Coast domination of the weapons systems business. In order to 
43Peck and Scherer, p. 107. 
44Ibid., p.96 . 
45u.s. Senate, Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, 
Nilitary Procurement, 86th Cong., lst Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1959), 
pp. 22- 24 . From Section 2, C, lll of the Bill. 
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present opposition to this bill, the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce 
organized an emergency industrial task force of prominent businessmen 
and "the task force called Professor Gerhard Rostvold of Pomona College, 
to prepare the California case against the conspiracy of the Easterners 
to 'raid' the Pacific Coast's defense cluster. '~6 
In the East, feelings also ran strong. Senator Javits stated: 
To many of us in the East, the so-called missile gap 
has been translat ed into the defense order gap. Many New 
Yorkers apply this term to the steady loss of defense con-
tracts in ou r State, while there has been a steady increase 
in prime defense missile contracts placed in other parts of 
the country, particularly with firms on the West Coast.47 
This sectional rivalry has continued through the years. 
In a press release , Governor Edmund G. Brown of California said 
that his state gets a large share of nati onal defense contracts because 
it earns them, not because the federal government is partial to the state. 
In a telegram to Senator Javits, the Governor objects to Javits ' critic-
ism of the Defense Department ' s contract award policy and his inference 
of favoritism to California. He told the New York Republican that Calif-
ornia gets 24.6 percent of defense contracts because it is able to provide 
the research facili ties and scientists to do 41.3 percent of all defense 
research and development being done in the country.48 
Following is the text of the Governor ' s telegram : 
I must ob ject t o the error and injustice of your charges 
agains t the national administration's policies for the awarding 
of defense contracts and the inference you draw of favoritism 
46Brown, p. 28. 
47u.s. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Procurement of the Joint 
Economic Committee, Hearings, Impact of Defense Pr ocuremen t , 86th Gong . , 
2nd Sess . (Washington, D. C. , 196D), p . 24. 
48Press Release 561, Office of the Governor of California, July 26, 
196 2. 
toward California. According to a recent Defense Depart-
ment study of contract awards with which you should be 
familiar, California has earned her 24.6 per cent share of 
all defense contract awards by providing the research 
facilities and skilled scientists who do 41.6 per cent of 
this country's research in the defense fields, especially 
in the rapidly expanding aerospace industry. The people 
of California have invested heavily to develop and support 
the finest system of higher education in the country. This 
provides the defense industries many of the facilities they 
must have for research and, more important, the trained 
scientists and technicians they require. I am sympathetic 
with your concern for New York's serious unemployment prob-
lems and I know the administration is, too. However, it 
is not need for defense contracts but the ability to fulfill 
them which must dictate the Defense Department's contract 
award policy. I respectfully suggest that New York would be 
in a better position to compete with California in the defense 
field if it were to give the attention to public higher edu-
cation which increasingly has been given top priority in 
our state.49 
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Despite these rivalries and accusations, it appears that politics 
have little bearing in the award of weapons systems contracts. 
Yet, from our own case studies, we would say that 
at least the direct effect of politics in weapon acquisition 
processes tends to be exaggerated. We discovered only a few 
decisions in which a possible direct political influence may 
have played a role, and even here the political factor . was so 
intermixed with other issues that it is difficult to discern 
its importance in shaping the outcome.50 
Concentration of Military Contracts 
Military contracts, in addition to being concentrated in specific 
geographic areas, are also concentrated in the hands of a relatively small 
number of large companies . Table 5 shows that the first 100 companies, in 
terms of contract volume, during the fiscal years 1958 through 1962, 
received from 74 . 2 percent to 72.3 percent of the United States total 
~Th~. 
50Peck and Scherer, p. 114. 
56 
Table 5. Percent of defense contract awards to first 100 companies 
Percent of U. s. total 
Fiscal ear 
Companies 
1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 
ls t 9 . 8 7.2 6.0 6 .5 5.6 
2nd 6.4 5 . 2 5 . 1 5 . 2 4 . 7 
3rd 3 . 6 4 . 5 4.8 5 . 2 4 . 4 
4th 3.5 4.1 4 . 6 4 . 1 4 .0 
5th 3.0 4.0 4.3 3.8 3.8 
l t o 26 . 3 25.0 24 . 8 24.8 22 . 5 
6 to 10 12.4 12 . 0 11.3 ll.8 ll.l 
ll to 25 19.1 17.6 17.4 18.2 17.2 
to 25 57 .8 54.6 53.5 54 . 8 50.8 
26 to 50 9.1 10.7 ll.3 ll.O 12.6 
51 to 75 4.8 5.5 5 .4 5 .5 6.0 
76 to 100 2.5 3 .0 3.2 2.9 2.9 
--
t o 100 74/~ 73.8 73 . 4 74.2 72.3 
Source: u.s . Department of Defense, 100 Com£anies and their Subsidiary 
Coq~orations Lis ted Accord ins to Net Values of Military Prime Contract 
~, n .d. (mime ographed) 
dollars of military contracts of $10,000 or more. Noteworthy is the 
fact that the first five companies in this group received 26.3 percent 
to 22 . 5 percent of the total, while the first 25 companies received 
from 57.8 percent to 50.8 percent of the total. These statistics reveal 
a tremendous concentration of economic power. The magnitude of this 
power can readily be seen from the totals of fiscal years 1961 and 1962. 
In fiscal year 1962, the 72 . 3 percent volume of military expenditures 
with the first 100 companies represented approximately $18.5 billion 
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out of a total of $25.5 billion, and in 1961 the 74.2 percent represented 
about $16.8 billion out of a total of $22.7 billion.Sl 
Congress has shown concern over this concentration of dollar out-
lays for military contracts. Some steps to encourage more widespread 
distribution of military outlays have been taken so that increased par-
ticipation by small business in government defense contracts may be 
achieved. The next chapter will be devoted to a discussion of the role 
of small business in weapons systems procurement. 
51Background Material on Economic Aspects of Military Procurement 
and Supply , pp. 13, 18. 
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CHAPTER IV 
SMALL BUSINESS AND DEFENSE PROCUREMENT 
Definition of Small Business 
What makes a business "small"- - and thus eligible for special treat-
ment- - depends on administrative judgment using criteria such as number 
of employees, sales volume, and type of activity. The dividing line 
between "medium" and "small" has been fuzzy . 
Small business has been generally defined for purposes of govern-
ment procurement as a concern employing no more than 500 persons . Recent 
changes have modified this definition so that the number of employees 
may be as high as a thousand i n certain businesses and industries, 
depending on their nature . Further, some industries are now classified 
as either little or big business, based on annual dollar sales. As an 
example, in the construction industry, the average annual sales of the 
concern and its affiliates must not exceed $7.5 million a concern. 1 The 
following general definition is quoted: 
A small-business concern shall be deemed to be one which is 
independently owned and operated and which is not dominant 
in its field of operation. In addition to the foregoing 
criteria, the Administrator, in making a deta il ed definition, 
may use these criteria among others: Number of employees 
and dollar volume of business. Where the number of employees 
is used as one of the criteria in making such definition for 
any of the purposes of this Act, the maximum number of em-
ployees which a small-business concern may have under the 
definition shall vary from industry to industry to the extent 
lArmed Service Procurement Regulation 1-701.4 (Washington, D.C., 
1964), p. 142. 
necessary to reflect differing characteristics of such 
industries and to take proper account of other relevant 
factors. 2 
Interest in Small Business 
The Small Business Act of 1953 (Public Law 163, 83rd Congress, 
lst Session) created the Small Business Administration. The following 
policy of the Congress with regard to small business is found within 
section 202 of that act: 
It is the declared policy of the Congress that the Govern-
ment should aid, assist, and protect insofar as possible 
the interests of small business concerns in order to pre-
serve free competitive enterprise, to insure that a fair 
proportion of the total purchases and contracts for supplies 
and services for the government be placed with small business 
enterprises, and to maintain and strengthen the over-all 
economy of the nation.3 
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The purchasing power of the federal government in regard to small 
business is being used as an implementing instrument of economic policy. 
Inasmuch as there has been concern over the placement of a 11 fair share 11 
of military procurement with small business, the government has adopted 
a deliberate policy of providing a greater share of such procurement to 
foster the welfare of the small business community. 
The interest in promoting the welfare of small business has long 
been the policy of Congress. However, in the past several years much 
emphasis has been placed on this area by the Executive Branch. President 
Kennedy made the following statement during his press conference on 
March 15, 1961: 
2u .s . Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, Small Business 
!£!,88th Cong., lst Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. l. 
3u.s. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business , Report of Small 
Business Participation in Gover nment Procurement, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(Washington, D.C., 1957), p. l. 
First, the Secretaries of the military departments have been 
instructed by the Deputy Secretary of Defense to t ake steps 
to provide a greater percentage of defense contracts for 
small business. Specifically the military departments have 
been asked to set a goal increasing individually in fiscal 
year 1962, small business participation by ten percent over 
the year for fiscal 1960. Contracts fo r small business in 
fiscal yea r 1960 amount ed to $3,444 million or 16 percent. 
We are going to try to increse that by at least 10 percent. 
In addition we are going to provide an increase for small 
business participation in research and development contracts. 
During that year this category of contracting accounted for 
$180 million, or 3.4 percent of the total. In addition, 
we are asking the Department of Defense to examine how 
additional contracts can be steered into distressed areas. 
At the present time we are not doing as much of that as I 
hope we can in the future.4 
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As a result of this interest by the Chief Executive and the goal 
he established, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, along 
with the Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force maintained a 
continuous followup on this matter during the following year and issued 
numerous memorandums to the military departments stressing the importance 
of increasing the volume of contract awards to sma ll business concerns 
Further, the Department of Defense established a program called 
"Operation Booster" in fiscal year 1962, under which every principal 
procurement organization was assigned an improvement quota against which 
their performance was measured monthly.5 
The results were that for the fi rst time in f ive yea rs a downward 
trend in the percentage of awards to small business was reversed as indi-
cated in Table 6. The percentage of prime contract awards6 increased 
4New York Times, March 16, 1961, p. 20. 
Su.s. Senate, Select Committee on Small Bus iness, The Role of 
Small Business in Government Procurement --1962-1963, 87th Gong., 2nd 
Sess., 1962 (Washington, D.C. , 1962), p . 5. 
6A prime contract award is a direct contract award from the Depart-
ment of Defense fo r specified goods or services to a business concern. The 
recipient of the award is a prime contractor. 
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from 16.1 percent in fiscal year 1960 and 15.9 percent in fiscal year 
1961 to 17.7 percent in fiscal year 1962. More remarkable, however, 
was the increase in the dollar volume to small business. There was 
an increase from $3.4 billion in fiscal year 1960 to $4.6 billion in 
fisca l year 1962. Th i s was a 35 percent increase. However, the decrease 
of prime contract awards from $4.6 billion or 17.7 percent of the total 
contract awards in fiscal year 1962 to $4.3 billion or 15.8 percent in 
fiscal year 1963 resulted in much Congressional criticism . 
However, these statistics reveal only one source of defense 
dollars to small business conce rns. To ascer tain the full share of 
the dollars received by small business, it will be necessary to examine 
the situation related to the amount of subcontracting7 dollars going to 
small business from other prime con tractors a l ong with the amounts they 
receive on prime contract awards . 
A "Fair Share" for Small Business 
In 1961 the Select Committee on Small Business of the United 
States Senate stated in its opening paragraph to Chapter II, "Government 
Procurement'' of their "Annual Report": 
With few changes, save for figures in dollars and percentages, 
the introduction to this chapter could easily be a dup l icate 
of the chapter on procurement in last year ' s annual report. 
Last year at this time, your committee expressed concern over 
the downward spiral of defense contracts being awarded to 
smaller firms, and commended the Air Force for its small 
but significant increase. Statistics for fiscal year 1960 
recorded the same dirge. For the sixth straigh t year, the 
percentage of defense awards going to smal l firms showed 
7A subcontract is a contract awarded by a prime contractor to 
another concern. 
a decline, from 25.3 percent in 1954 to 16.1 percent the 
past yea r. B 
The Committ ee i n the same report, goes on further t o state: 
Nowhere is it more pointedly driven home that small 
business is not receiving a fair sha re than when one 
consid ers that just three major prime contractors r e-
ceived a grea ter percentage of defense contract dolla r s 
than did all the thousands of small business f irms in 
the United States combined. Your committee ca nnot visual-
ize the necess ity for such intense centra lization of our 
nation's defense effort, even allowing fo r al l the techno-
logical factors modern weaponry has introduced into the 
procurement machinery.9 
Further concern is evidenced by the fo ll owing: 
The joint failu r e of the Department of Defen se and the 
Small Business Administration to halt the decline and 
correspondingly, t o increase the share of small business 
in the awarding of military prime contracts has brought 
about a situation whi ch should no longer be tolerated. 10 
Research in this area revea ls numerous references to a "fair 
share" of defense dollars for small business, but a clear concis e 
definiti on of wh a t cons titutes a "fair " percentage of the total dollar 
outlay for defense purposes cannot be found. Mr. Mau rice L. Johnson 
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stated that, "I have ye t to see a declaration by any agency, or Congres-
sional Committee that s pec ifically states the meaning of a 'fa i r share' . "11 
The gove rnment has been remarkably silent on defining the "fair share. " 
However, the Department of Defense has es tablished a target for the amount 
of dollar ou tlays t o small business. 
Bu.s. Senate Sel ec t Committee on Small Business, Eleventh Annual 
Report, 87th Gong., l st Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 19. 
9Ibid. 
10Ibid . , p. 5. 
11Interview with Maurice L. Johnson, Executive for Small Business, 
Directorate of Procurement and Product ion, Headquarters, Air Force Logis-
tics Command, United States Air Force, May 25, 1964. 
64 
The Department of Defense established new goals in early 1963, 
and these were to rais e the value of prime and subcontract awards to 
smal l business in the fol lowing three years so that by the end of fiscal 
year 1965, small business will receive more than $10 billion in defense 
awards, or approximately 33 percent of the defense procurement budget. 
The fiscal year 1963 goal was to increase prime contract awards from 
$200 to $300 million over fiscal year 1962 and subcontract awards by 
$300 million. The 1964 and 1965 fiscal year goals are to add $300 
million each year to both the total value of prime contract and subcon-
tract awards to small business.l 2 Whether these goals are attained 
remains to be seen , and once attained, whether they will be considered 
sa tisfactory by Congress is also problematical. 
The Small Business Share of the Defense Dollar 
In fiscal year 1963, small business firms obtained a total of 
$8.8 billion in defense contracts which consisted of $4 . 6 billion in 
prime contract awa rds and $4.2 billion in subcontract payments from 
large defense subcontractors. This total was the equivalent of 31.6 
percent of all prime contract awards to business firms in the Uni t ed 
States. 13 
As reflected in Table 6 the Army and the Defense Supply Agenc y 
award a greater percentage of their total procurement dollars to small 
business than do either the Navy or the Air Force. The Air Force 
12u . s. Department of Defense, Small Business Report, Small Business 
Objectives for Fiscal Year 1963 and Subsequent years (Washington, D.C., 
1963), p. 8. 
l3u.s. Senate, Conference Relating to Small Business Participation 
in Government Procurement--1963, 88th Cong., lst Sess. (Washington, D.C., 
1964)' p. 2. 
traditionally has awarded a l ower percentage of their procurement 
dollars to small business concerns because their purchases are dom-
inated by aircraft and missiles in which small business plays a minor 
role. On tl ·' other hand, small business has done relatively well with 
the Army because of their requirements for a larger proportion of sub-
sistence, textiles, and automotive items in which small companies play 
a major role. This is also reflected by types of items in Table 
which show small business procurement by major programs. 
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As shown in Table 7, in fiscal year 1963, small business received 
51.3 percent of all contract awards for subsistence items and 62.5 per-
cent of all awards for textiles, clothing, and equipage. The recently 
activated Defens e Supply Agency which procures much of the combined 
requirements of items such as electronics supplies, subsistence, cloth-
ing, etc., for the Army, Navy, and the Air Force is in a better position 
to award a high percentage of their total contract dollars to small com-
panies, because most of their purchases are items in which small business 
has a major stake. For the fiscal years of 1962 and 1963, the Defense 
Supply Agency awards to small business concerns were 46.2 percent and 
40.5 percent of all prime contract dollars, respectively, as against 
9.6 percent and 8.7 percent, respectively, by the Air Force (Table 3). 
The long term trend in military procurement, including the small 
business percentage, is shown in Table 6 and Figure l. After the close 
of hostilities in Korea, there was a sharp cutback in military procure-
ment of heavy equipment (fiscal year 1954), and a correspondingly sharp 
increase in che percentage going to small business firms. The inter-
national situation and the increasing emphasis on modern expensive 
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Figure 1. Awards to small and other business firms 
Source : U.S. Department of Defense, Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments , 
July 1963 - March 1964 (Washington, D.C . , 1964), p. 13. 
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weapons brought about a steady increase in the total value of military 
procurement in each subsequent fiscal year, except for fiscal year 
1960, when there was a moderate decline . The small business dollars 
increased to $3.7 billion by fiscal year 1957, and r emained approxima t ely 
at that l evel through fiscal year 1961 . During fisca l year 1962, result-
ing from the emphasis placed on increasing the smal l share of the defense 
dollar by the execu tive branch, small business firms received $4.6 billion 
in military prime contracts, the highest since the peak Korean War year 
of 1962. There was a decline to $4.3 billion in fiscal year 1963.14 
As shown in Table 8, for the seven fiscal years from 1957 through 
1963, small firms averaged $3,653,000,000 per year in reported subcontract 
receipts and $3,902 ,000,000 in direct prime contracts, a total of 
$7,555,000,000 in defense business per year. In this same period, 
average annual military prime contract awards t o all business firms were 
$23,041,000,000.15 
Not all military prime contractors and subcontractors took part 
in the Department of Defense subcontracting program which requires the 
reporting of subcontract payments and therefore the reported volume of 
subcontract payments to small business firms may be und erstated . Up to 
January 1960, th e Defense Small Business Subcontracting Program was on 
a voluntary basis . On J anuary l, 1960, the program became mandatory 
for all prime contractors, and also on all subcontractors, who obtained 
contracts of $1 million or more with substantial subcontracting possibilities. 
14u.s. Department of Defense, Military Prime Contract Awards and 
Subcontract Payments, July 1963--March 1964 (Was hington, D.C ., 1964), 
p . 7. 
Table 8. Defense small busines s subcontracting prog ram , by fiscal year (dollar amounts in 
millions) 
1957 1958 1959 l96o 1961 
l. Number of Large Contractors Repor ting 
Their Subcontr act Receipts and Payments 
to Depart.ment o f Defense 298 294 298 298 309 
2. t-1 i litary Subcontract Payments by 
Reporting Contractors, Total $9,314 $9, 026 $9,144 $9,666 $9,407 
a . To Smal l Business c,ncerns 3, 562 3,242 3,336 3,587 3,495 
b . To Other Bus iness Concerns 5, 752 5, 784 5,8o8 6,079 5,912 
3· Percent of Total Paid to Small Business 
C:mcerns (Line 2a ~ Line 2) 38.2~ 35.~ 36 .5~ 37 . 1~ 37 . 2~ 
4. Military Contract Re ceipts by Reporting 
Contractors from Prime and Subcontrac t 
Work $16,992 $17,479 $18,704 $19,095 $19 ,8o3 
5. Percent of Receipts Paid Out to All 
Business Concerns (Line 2 ~ Line 4) 54 .fl1, 51.~ 48.~ 50 . ~ 47 · 5~ 
Source: U.S . Department of Defense, Military Prime Contract Awards and Subcontract Payments, 
July 1963- March 1964 (Washington, D.C., 1964), p. 49. 
1962 l9f3 
378 453 
$10 , 56o $ll,4ll 
4,011 4,341 
6,549 7,070 
38 .~ 38.~ 
$22,337 $23,667 
47.3~ 48.~ 
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Effective January l, 1962, the $1 million limitation was cut to 
$500,000. 16 Thus with greater participation and more accurate report-
ing, future statistics shou ld present a truer picture. 
Table 8 shows for the fiscal years 1957 through 1963, the t ota l 
receipts of large concerns for military contracts and in turn, the 
amounts these concerns paid to small and other business firms for sub-
contract work. Over the seven- year period, large concerns paid sub-
contractors 49.6 percent of the total amount they received on military 
contracts, and small business firms received 37.3 percent of the total 
subcontracts.l7 
The Subcontracting Program 
Prime contractors, thos e who have direct contracts with the 
government, like· any other business, uti lize a portion of their recipts 
to buy goods and services from other firms. The transactions involved 
are basically of two types: The purchase of materials and parts at 
fixed prices, transactions that are similar to those in the rest of 
the economy; and the purchase by subcontract of subsystems. The latter 
generally involves a continuing contractual relationship between pur-
chaser and seller for a development effor t rather than the sale of a 
finished off-the- shelf item. These subcontracts involve the develop-
ment of such items as air conditioning units, ground handling equipment, 
test equipment, and guidance systems. These items usually require an 
extensive development effort, and are especially designed for a particular 
1~~. 
17Th~. 
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weapons program, and usually require engineering skills that the prime 
contractor does not normally possess.l8 
It is generally recognized that the growing technological com-
plexities involved in producing military and space items for the govern-
ment are reducing the prime contract oppo rtunities for small concerns. 
Consequently, efforts are being made to expand the role of small business 
in defense contracting via the subcontracting route.l9 
The government has mounted an intensive program to assure that 
small business has the opportunity to broaden its participation in 
defense procurement through subcontracting. The enactment of Public 
Law 87-305 on September 26, 1961, required the enac tment of a subcon-
tracting program jointly by the Department of Defense, the Small Business 
Administration, and the General Services Administration. The regulations 
implementing this program are contained in the Armed Services Procurement 
Regulations and in the Federal Procurement Regulations. 
The subcontracting program requires that government contracting 
officers insert clauses into contracts over $500,000 which will require 
prime contractors to establish formal small business subcontracting 
programs and to fi le requir ed reports to the procurement agency on 
these activities. Further, it provid es for periodic reports of these 
subcontracting activities by the procurement agency to the Department 
of Defense for monitorship purposes. In contracts of over $5,000 
estimated costs, contractors are "urged " to accompl ish the maximum 
18Peck and Scherer, p. 147. 
19u.s. Senate, Select Committee on Small Business, Small Business 
Administrati on--1963, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p . 26. 
Cited hereafter as Small Business Administrati on--1963. 
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amount of subcontracting that they consider to be consistent with the 
efficient performance of the contract. However, no reporting to the 
procurement agency is required.20 
Add itionally, under this program, major contractors are required 
to maintain records reflecting how many large and how many small firms 
were solicited for subcontracts.; how many large and how many sma 11 
firms bid; what firm received the award and, if applicable, why small 
business did not receive the award. In addition to the procurement 
agency involved, the Small Business Administration has access to these 
records. 21 
The jointly developed subcontracting program has three objec tives: 
{l) to enab l e small concerns to be considered fairly as sub-
contractors and suppliers to the gove rnment contractors 
and subcontractors; 
(2) to insu r e that the latter concerns will, at the request 
of the SBA, consult with SBA through the appropriate pro-
curing agencies; and 
(3) to enable SBA to obtain from any government procurement 
agency such available or reasonably obtainable infor-
mation and records concerning subcontracting by its 
prime contrac tors and their subcontractors, as SBA con-
siders necessary.22 
These objectives and their implementing directives give the SBA 
a gr eat deal of altitude in the subcontracting program, but does not 
provide the SBA with the authority to dictate to a prime contractor 
to award a subcont ract to one business concern rather than another . 
The SBA states: 
20lb id. , p. 44. 
21Katherine Johnsen, "Small Bueiness Share Grows in Contracts," 
Aviation Week and Space Technology, Mid-December 1962, p. 74. 
22
small Business Administration-~1963, p. 26. 
Our means in dealing with a prime contractor who may 
fail or refuse to utilize qualified small business 
sources is the power of reason. It is our task to dis-
suade him from continuing the practice by emphasizing 
the resulting injury to a vital segment of the national 
economy, and, where possiblej by pointing out resulting 
injury to his own business.2 
In order to increase the participation of small business con-
cerns in government subcontracting, the Small Business Administration 
seeks to identify the types of procurement which are potentially sus -
ceptible to small business participation. The role of the prime con-
tractor is to provide adequate descriptive material which clearly 
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identifies the product or service being purchased. The Small Business 
Administration then seeks to provide the names of those small business 
firms which can provide the product or service to the prime contractor. 
Each regional SBA office maintains a register of small business firms 
that have listed their productive facilities for the geographic terri-
tory served by the office to aid in this endeavor. This information 
is also centrally maintained in Washington, D.C. Thi s system e nables 
the Administration to make timely referrals of small business concerns 
to the major prime contractors participating in the subcontracting 
program. This facilities inventory contains the names of over 50,000 
small firms and provides a clearinghouse through which the government 
and large contractors may obtain information about small firms capable 
of meeting their needs.24 
23rbid. 
24rbid . , p. 35. 
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Set-Aside Program 
The set- aside program is another of the vehicles for increas-
ing the participation of small business in the procurement of defense 
supplies and services. The set-aside program is one by which certain 
contracts are set aside for exclusive competition among small business 
firms to the exclusion of large business concerns. It is authorized in 
section 15 of the Small Business Act of 1958, as amended, and in the 
Armed Services Procuremen t Regulations, as follows: 
It is the policy of the Department of Defense to place 
a fair proportion of its total purchases and contracts 
for supplies, research and development, and services 
(including but not limited to, contracts for maintenance, 
repair, and construction) with small business concerns. 2 ~ 
Further, it is stated that: 
. . any individual procurement or class of procurements 
or an appropriate part thereof, shall be set aside for the 
exclusive participation of small business concerns when 
such action is (i) jointly determined by an SBA representa-
tive and the contracting officer upon the initiation of 
either agency, or (ii) if no SBA representative is available, 
is unilatera lly determined by the contracting officer to be 
in the interest of maintaining or mobilizing the nation ' s 
full productive capacity, or in the interest of war or 
national defense programs, or in the interest of assuring 
that a fair proportion of government procurement is placed 
with small business concerns . 26 
The emphasis placed on the set- aside program was one of the major 
reasons for the marked increase i n prime contractual awards to smal l 
business in fiscal year 1962 . As shown in Table 6, this year saw the 
highest perc entage of awards given to small business since 1957, as well 
as the highest dollar amount being awarded.27 
25Armed Services Procurement Regulation l-702 (Washington, D.C . , 
1964), p. 144.1 
26Armed Services Procurement Regulation l - 706.1 (Washington, D.C., 
1964)' p. 148. 
27The Role of Small Business in Government Procurement--1962- 63, 
p. 3 . 
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The use of small business set- asides was sharply inc reased, 
reaching the highest level in five years. The increase• from $1.21 
billion in 1961 to $1.77 billion in 1962 in total set- asides as re-
fleeted in Table 9 was extremely significant, par t icu l ar l y when t hese 
statistics ref l ec t a 46 . 3 percent incr~ase in these t ypes of awards 
by the Department of Defense to small business.28 
Table 9. Set - asides agreed to and set-aside procurement awa rds 
Fiscal year Fiscal yea r Percent 
1961 1962 i ncrease 
Total (agreed to ) $1 ' 64 7 ' 651' 7 51 $2,295,074 , 782 39.3 
Department 
of Defense 1 ,434,565,963 1' 965 , 465 ' 648 37.0 
Civilian 
agencies 213' 085 ' 7 88 329' 609' 134 54.7 
Total (awards) $1,216,801,518 $1,773,803,530 45.8 
Department 
of Defense 1,052,414,134 1,539,174,044 46.3 
Civilian 
agencies 164,387,384 234' 629,486 42.7 
Sou r ce: U.S. Sena te, Se l ec t Committee on Sma ll Bus iness , Th e Rol e 
~11 Bu s ines s in Gover nme nt Procurement - - 1962- 1963, 87 t h Cong. , 
2nd Sess. 196 2 (Washi ngt on, D.C., 1962), p. 11 . 
28Ib i d . , p. 4 . 
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Also noteworthy is the fact that the awards resulting from t he 
use of set-asides represent 36 percent of the total awards awarded by 
the Department of Defense to small business concerns during fiscal 
year 1962. 29 As reflected in Table 10, the dolla r amount of the se t-
asides agreed to exceeded the quantities awarded. This is norma l , 
inasmuch as small business concerns are not a l ways interested or capable 
of performing in all contracts which are set aside for them and con-
sequently many of them will revert to large business concerns. 
Table 10. Joint set-asides, comparison of fisca l years 1954-1962 a 
Fiscal 
year 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
Agreed 
Number of 
contracts 
1,621 
3,924 
6,075 
11 > 851 
17,8 19 
22,338 
21 > 592 
34 > 256 
44,839 
to 
Amount 
228,504 
386,611 
497,678 
744,335 
1,062,454 
1 > 142,625 
1,102,935 
1,647,652 
2,295,075 
aool l a r value in thousands . 
Awarded 
Number of 
contracts Amount 
1 > 249 $ 101 ,690 
3,742 193,777 
8,140 344,810 
13 , 416 552 , 573 
18 > 149 676,749 
24,800 848,570 
24 > 152 878,169 
34,272 1,216 , 802 
56> 944 1,773 , 804 
Source: U. S . Senate, Select Committee on Sma l l Business, The Rol e of 
small Business i n 'Government Procurement--1 962-1963, 87 t h Cong. , 2nd 
Sess. (Wash i ngton , D.C. , 1962), p . 11. 
29
rbid. 
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Increasing Competition 
Providing increased opportunities for competing for defense 
work to small business concerns is another objective of the Depart-
ment of Defense and the Sma ll Business Admini s tra tion. 
The policy of sole source procurement or noncompetitive procure-
ment by the Department of Defense has been the sub j ect of criticism by 
Congress. The critics of sole source procuremen t have two major com-
plaints about this policy. First, they contend that it closes the door 
to small companies in bidding for defense work; second, the lack of 
competition results in added costs to the Department of Defense for 
its purchases of supplies and services. 
Contract award statistics show that a l arge portion of defense 
contract do l lars are obligated without any direct interfirm competition . 
The military departments were asked to furnish a machine 
tabulation of all such sole source purchases accomplished 
in the period April --June 1959, a period during which total 
defense expenditures amounted to $7 .3 billion. The results 
of the compilation indicated that of this total, $5.6 
billion was awarded noncompetitively . Needless to say, each 
of these sole source actions was negotia t ed rather than for-
mally advertised.30 
In addition to the efforts in the subcontracting and set- aside 
programs, the Department of Defense has taken s t eps to increase competi-
tion by reducing the amount of so l e source procurement and inc reasing 
formal advertising. By so doing, it offer s grea t e r opportunit ies for 
sma l l business participation in defense wo rk . Thomas D. Morris, Assist -
ant Secretary of Defense (Installations and Logistics), made the fo llow-
i ng statement in this regard : 
3Du . s. Senate, Select Committe~ on Small Business, Government 
Procuremen t--1960 , 87th Cong., l st Sess (Washington, D.C., 1961) , p. 1. 
I would like to stress the fact that there is a very im-
portant relationship between the accomplishments made in 
assuring a fair share of Defense procurement to small 
business, and in our objective to increase the total volume 
of procurements awarded on the basis of price competition. 
Last year we awarded 35.6 percent of our total purchases on 
the basis of formal advertising and other forms of price 
competition as compared to 32.9 percent in fiscal year 1961. 
This means that approximately $650 million in purchases were 
converted from a sole source to a price-competitive basis. 
Our studies show that each dollar spent under price competi-
tion buys at least 25 percent more. Hence, it can be seen 
that our smaller business program serves a dual function--
(1) it opens up more opportunities for small firms; and (2) 
it provides an added incentive to our technical personnel 
to seek out opportunities for competitive procurement with 
the accompanying cost reduction benefits. Hence, there is 
a double bonus which accruse from a vi~orous small business 
program in the Department of Defense. 3 
Research and Development 
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Another area in which attempts have been made to increase small 
business participation has been in research and development. However, 
the results have been less than satisfying to Congress. 
The following quotation indicates the feeling of the Select Com-
mittee on Small Business of the United States Senate concerning the con-
centration of military research and development. 
p. 5. 
Among all the forces that contribute to the growth of mon-
opoly power, few operate more insidiously than the overloading 
of g iant corporations with military production contracts in 
the hands of a few score corporations (many of which while 
organized, as private enterprises, are so substantially sup-
ported through defense contracts as to have the characteristics 
of Government arsenals), may reduce the present profits of 
qualified small companies, the even greate r concentration of 
research and development contracts i n the hands of big corpor-
ations (currently about 96.5 percent) has the effect of closing 
the door of existence to many sma~l companies . 
31The Role of Small Business in Government Procurement- - 1962-1963, 
32Eleventh Annual Report, p. 5. 
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It is estimated that every research and development dollar spent 
generates $7.00 worth of sales in about five years. It is also stated 
that those companies not having active research and development programs 
are courting disaster. Since the government pays for 60 percent of all 
research performed by American industry, ·the conclusion is reached that 
concentration of research contracts in the laboratories of large corpor-
ations guarantees them that they will enjoy a formidable headstart over 
smaller companies in the development of consumer products which are 
often the inevitable by-product of military research contracts.33 This 
committee goes on to state: 
With this basic reality in mind, it may well be that those 
in the Defense Department of good will toward small business, 
urged and aided by their counterparts in the Small Business 
Administration, will want to develop a joint crash program 
to break the monopoly of research and development contracts 
now so tightly held by the Nation ' s corporate giants.34 
Table 11 shows the extent of awards for research and development 
to small business. Despite the interest shown by the Senate Small Business 
Committ ee and the various programs established by th e Department of Defense 
to increase the placement of res earch and development contracts with small 
business, these actions have not been too effective. Although an absolute 
dollar value increase in contract awards to sma ll business for research 
and development work went from $161.3 million to $197.7 milli on between 
fiscal years 1961 and 1963, along with an increase in the percentage of 
total awards from 2.9 percent to 3.5 percent, the percentage dropped to 
2 .7 percent for the first nine months of fiscal year 1964. 35 
33Ibid. 
34Ibid. 
35Hilitary Prime Contract Awards and Subcont ra ct Payments, p. 24. 
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The Department of Defense has a program which requires that 
contracting officers consider small concerns for research and develop-
ment work. I f small business is not solicited, a statement to this 
effect must be included in the procurement fi le setting forth the reasons 
for non-solitication . 36 Considera tion was given to using set-aside pro-
cedures for the purchases of research and development by the Department 
of Defense; however , the following statement reflects their position on 
this matter. 
We have concluded that should the small business set-aside 
procedure be adopted for R and D contracts, the Government 
would rule out of consideration large firms whose potentially 
superior competence (in the set-aside cases) would be lost to 
the military services in the development of military items. 
Therefore, we believe that it i~not in the interest of the 
Government to adopt the set-aside technique in this extremely 
important area of procurement.37 
This official position of the Department of Defense would appear 
to rule out any appreciable increase in the future on the amount of 
research and development awards to small business. 
Organized Aid to Small Business 
Overseeing the efforts of the Department of Defens e and the Small 
Business Administration to provid e a larger share or defense dollars to 
small business concerns is the Select Commit t ee on Small Business of the 
U.S.Senate and the Select Committee t o Conduct a Study and Investigation 
of the Prob lems of Sma ll Business of the U.S. House of Representatives. 
Both groups are unanimously authorized each session of Congress to 
36The Role of Small Business in Government Procurement --1962-1963, 
p. 8 . 
3?Ibid. Statement by Thomas D. Morris, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Installations and Logistics). 
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continue their activities on behalf of small firms. Annual public 
hearings before the Senate group focus attention on government procure-
ment policies programs and projects aimed at strengthening the position 
of small business . In addition, both committees have staffs which can 
handle the individual problems of sma ll firms on an individual basis 
during the year.38 
The Small Business Administration, which exists for the sole 
purpose of aiding and protecting small business, is one of the fastest 
growing agencies in Washington. The following figures reflect the growth 
of personnel in this agency since fiscal year 1959 and October 31, 1963:39 
October 31, 1963 3,258 
June 30, 1962 3,140 
June 30, 1961 2,633 
June 30, 1960 2,244 
June 30, 1959 2,013 
Noteworthy, is the growth between 1961 and 1962 (fiscal year 1962). 
This was during the period when the President first began to give emphasis 
to the sma ll business program. Personne l of this agency are located all 
over the country--750 being located in Washington and the balance in the 
field. 40 A budget of $35 million provides this group with the means for 
the fu l fillment of its objectives.41 
Cooperating with the Small Business Administration is the wide-
flung organizationa l resources of the Department of Defense . The Defense 
Department has a Directorate of Small Business which has equal status with 
the Directorate for ProcuremenL Poli cy and the Directorate for Procurement 
38 11Small Business Shar e Crows in Contracts, " p . 74. 
39small Business Administration--1963, p. 8. 
40 "Small Business Share Grows in Contracts," p. 75 . 
41small Business Administration--1963, p. 8. 
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Management under the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations 
and Logistics. These agencies, between them, formulate policies govern-
ing the total procurement activities of the Department of Defense. In 
addition, the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Defense Supply Agency each have 
small business offices at the Pentagon. 
To carry out the program formulated in Washington to aid small 
business, the defense establishment has small business specialists 
located at 500 depots, commands, and other installations that engage 
in procurement throughout the country.4 2 
Further, the Commerce Department publishes the Commerce Business 
Daily which tells the small businessman where to look for business. It 
lists: 
Products and services which individual government procure-
ment offices are planning to buy currently; proposed pro-
curements by all government agencies; subcontract opportuni-
ties by defense prime contractors, and prime contra ct awards, 
which furnish leads to possible subcontract possibilities.43 
All in all , the government's organizat i on and programs for provid -
ing guidance, and assis tance in obtaining a greater share of the defense 
dollar are extensive. 
42
"Small Business Share Grows in Cont r acts, " p. 75. 
43Ibid. 
CHAPTER V 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT 
The Role of the Government 
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Society is living through an accelerating scientific revolution 
which is leaving no part of our culture untouched. The federal govern-
ment is playing a central role in this revolution through its partici-
pation in and sponsorship of research and development in all areas. The 
vast expenditures of funds for this purpose have had myriad effects. 
Changes are being wrought which affect our personal lives, our 
institutions, and our industries. Numerous benefits have accrued to the 
economy resulting from this research, although the major portion has been 
related to military projects. Completely new types of organizations have 
been created as a result of government-sponsored research. Further, 
development-oriented indus tries, such as aircraft, missiles, and elec-
tronics, now receive greater attention than the traditional large 
manufacturing industries such as automobiles, machinery, and stee 1. 
Since the United States Government plays such a central role in 
this scientific revolution which affects our social, economic, and 
political lives, it is essential that the impact of government partici-
pation and policies in research and development be fully understood. 
Research has become so large, that if it were to be classified as an 
industry it would rank among the top twelve manufacturing indust ri es . 
There are 350,000 people employed in research and development- - close to 
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65 percent of the number employed in the auto industry. 1 It certainly 
ranks with big industry, considering the billions expended for research 
each year. 
Table 12 reflects the increasing government expenditures in all 
areas of research, particularly for national defense which consumes over 
65 percent of the federal research dollar. 
Table 12. Federal expenditures for research and development, fiscal 
years 1953-1963 {in millions of dollars) 
Fiscal National 
year defense8 Other Total 
1953 2,832 269 3,101 
1954 2,868 280 3,148 
1955 2,979 289 3,268 
1956 3' 104 332 3,435 
1957 4,027 433 4,460 
1958 4,463 523 4,985 
1959 5,048 744 5' 792 
1960 6,639 1,103 7' 742 
1961 7' 719 1,572 9,291 
1962 7,820 2,424 10,244 
1963 8,572 3,793 12,365 
aAmounts included in this table under "National defense" for the 
Department of Defense have been compiled from the best available 
summary data to provide maximum possible comparabi lity for the 
years shown. 
Sour ce: Report t o the President on Government Contracting for 
Research and Development, April 30, 1962. 
l"Research: Leave How Much to Uncle Sam7" Business Week, Decem-
ber 23, 1961, p. 53. 
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Table 13 indicates the sources and distribution of funds for all 
research, government and private. It further identifies the amount of 
research being performed by basic g roups. These statistics reveal that 
about two-thirds of all research and development expenditures are made 
by the federal government; but that it performs only 15 percent of the 
Table 13. Summary information concerning the distribution of national 
research and development fundsa 
National research and develoement ex2enditures 
(in millions of dollars) 
Fiscal years 
By source of funds 1954 1955 1959 1960 1961 
Federal government $2' 740 $3,070 $7,170 $8,290 . $9, 220 
Industry 2,240 2,365 3,620 4,030 ' 4,490 
Universities and 
university research 
centers 130 140 190 200 210 
Other not-for-
profits 40 45 90 100 120 
Total $5,150 $5,620 $11 '070 $12,620 $14' 040 
By performer 
Federal government $ 970 $ 950 $1' 730 $1,830 $2,060 
Industry 3,630 4,070 8,300 9,550 10,500 
Universities and 
university r esearch 
centers 450 480 840 1,000 1,200 
Other not- for-
profits 100 120 200 240 280 
Total $5,150 $5,620 $11,070 $12,620 $14,040 
aThis table illustrates the growth of the total national expenditures 
for research and development and their distribution among basic types 
of performing institutions and types of functions. 
~: Report to the President on Government Contracting for Research 
and Development, April 30, 1962. Prepared by the Bureau of the Budget 
(Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 277. 
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nation's total research and development in its own laboratories while 
expending approximately 20 percent of its own outlays in federally-owned 
laboratories. About two-thirds of the federal expenditures are made 
through contracts with industry and over 10 percent with university 
and other non-profit organizations. There was an increase of 236 percent 
in government-sponsored r esearch from 1954 until 1961, with a correspond-
ing increase of 173 percent for all research during the same period. 
To bri ng these figures up-to-date in the fiscal year 1963, a 
total national expenditure of $16 billion for research and development, 
$12 billion was for government objectives and only 25 percent went to 
the civilian economy . The federal research effort is programmed at 
almost $15 billion in 1964 with $7.6 billion for defense and $4.2 
billion for the National Spac e Agency, which is to a great extent re-
lated to the defense effort and which can be identified with aircraft 
( 
and missile technology.2, 
Balance between. Defense and Civilian Purposes 
Industry, represented by the U. S. Chamber of Commerce, feels that 
these expenditures indicate that there is a serious imbalance between re-
search for national defense and research for civi l ian purposes.3 
2u.s. Congress, Subcommittee on Defense Procurement, of the Joint 
Economic Committee, Impact of Military Supply and Service Activities on 
the Economy, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 162. 
Helge Holst, corporate counsel for Arthur D. Little, Inc., an industrial 
research firm representing the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, appeared before 
the Subcommittee on Defense Procurement, Of The Joint Economic Committee 
and submitted a prepared statement and provided other testimony. Cited 
hereafter as Holst. 
3Holst, p. 162. 
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The Chamber does not d eny t he need for st r ong military defense, 
but feels that a greater balance is necessary between research and 
development expenditures devoted to military and civilian pu rposes. 
The Chamber's representative exp la ined that research a nd development 
contr ibute substantia lly toward the goa l s of ful l employme nt and a ri sing 
standard of living, with its contribution of new products, new industries, 
and new processes which increase productivity, thereby providing employ-
ment for an expa nding force and maintaining costs within limits, which 
make the resulting outflow of goods and services wid ely avai l able . How-
eve r, there is overwhelming evidence which indicates that the 1 imited 
research and developmen t resources have been increasingly diver t ed from 
civilian indus tri a l purposes t o primarily military a nd space programs. 
Wi th on ly 25 percent of research a nd development expenditures going 
toward s civilian-oriented programs, the national Chamber asserts that 
the ex t ent of t his dive rsion be recognized . It is considered very ser-
ious tha t the Un ited States effort in civilian- oriented resea rch i s well 
be low that of other major industria l coun tr ies (such as J apa n , West Ger-
many, a nd others). Proportiona lly, the United States research and 
development talent devoted to civi l ian indust r y and commer ce is only 
half tha t of West Germany. It is asserted by the United Stat es Chamber 
of Comme r ce that this is a potential cause of lagging employment and a 
deterrent to increased productivity. 
The Chamber continues and a r gues s trongly for national policy 
to have as its ob j ective recognition of the rela tive importance of a 
sound economy as weighed against t he prestige value of a space explora-
tion or overkill in military defense . Considering that the government's 
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needs must absorb a substantial portion of the nation's research and 
development, the Chamber asks two questions " ... in what ways can 
this be handled so as to produce minimum diversions from the private 
sector?" And ''What unnecessary practices have contributed to the 
present situation and how might they be changed? "4 
What is it that needs changing? According to the Chamber, govern-
ment contractual policies regarding research performed by private organi-
zations tend to isolate this work from the civilian industrial effort, 
thereby increasing costs and requiring larger amounts of personnel, both 
scientific and other. Further, the great amounts of research and develop-
ment being accomplished in government laboratories by government personnel 
shows up in a duplication of closely related projects and also in duplicate 
staffs and facilities. Joint use of personnel and facilities between the 
various services in the Department of Defense do not often use common 
facilities. The limited resources of the nation cannot afford this 
luxury of duplication: " ... ' single ' service or shared operation of 
a single facility would promote efficiency and achieve a greater degree 
of transfer of technology and experience from one project to another. '~ 
Duplication of Research 
An opposing view to this matter of centralization of research and 
elimination of duplication in research and development efforts is founded 
on the basis that because of the uncertainties involved, some duplication 
is desirable and there has been, at times, too little duplication. The 
4rbid., p. 163. 
5r bid., p. 164. 
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state of the art has not yet reached the point where precise answers 
can be given as to how much duplication there should be. "There is 
a strong case for some duplication in the development of critical 
weapons systems, despite their great cost, because of the disastrous 
consequences if the one horse that we back runs last."6 Depending 
upon the magnitude of the problem apd the uncertainties of the develop-
ment, several approaches may be necessary--perhaps completely independ-
ent approaches using competing contractors. There should also be 
greater duplication, the less it costs to duplicate. As a result of 
the uncertainties and when duplications are relatively inexpensive, a 
great deal of "temporary" duplication is desirable. As more knowledge 
is gained and the more expensive stages of development are reached, the 
number of routes t o be followed shou ld be decreased. 
Related to too little duplication is too little competition. 
Either is possible without the other. Duplication without competition 
occurs when multiple paths are taken by the same o rgani zation. Competi-
tion without duplication may occur, as an example, when the Army and the 
Navy compete for the budget dollar, even though they may never develop 
the same type of weapons. As in any competition, there is a certain 
amount of s timulation to those engaged in research in the fear that 
another laboratory will beat it to the object ive. Competition between 
the military services has proven beneficial in the past. The criticisms 
of duplication and competition are based on a fundamental misconception 
of the nature of research and development. The treatment of the uncertain 
6charles J. Hitch and Roland N. McKean, The Economics of Defense 
in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 
p. 249 . 
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as certain is responsible. Suppression of competition and luplication 
occurs because 
Particular duplications are obviously wasteful from the 
vantage point of hindsight, apparently unaware that 
duplication is a rational necessity when we are confronted 
with uncertainty and that competition is our best protec-
tion against bureaucratic inertia. 7 
Military research and development is being criticized for pre-
cisely those characteristics which it has in common with research and 
development in the privat e sector. Res earch and development in the 
American economy is uncoordinated, without central planning or direction 
and with a great deal of duplication and rivalry. And with the aid of 
hindsight, one can find waste.S 
Benefits o( Military Research to the 
Civilian Sector 
ln regard to waste, it is indeed a waste if the secondary benefiLs 
of military research and development as applicable to the civilian economy 
are not full realized; however there have been significant benefits gained 
by the privat e sector from military research in many areas. The r esea rch 
and development efforts in aircraft and engines have certainly spilled 
over into benefits for commercial aviation. There are many good examples, 
and if these benefits both direct and indirect, could be totalled, the 
amount would be staggering. 
Military research and development is like any other research and 
development in that it seeks new knowledge, techniques, and products. 
7Ibid., p. 256. 
Sib id. , p. 25 7 . 
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It differs from civilian research and development only to the extent 
that its search is for knowledge, techniques, and products to meet 
military needs . This distinction, however, is much less real than 
actual. This is so because the term "military" is made up of a com-
plex of activities, many of which have civilian counterparts. The 
Armed Forces embody activities which are very similar to, or identical 
with, numerous civilian activities--although the objectives differ.9 
It therefore follows that military r esearch and development results 
in findings which are of great value to the economy at large . 
An early example of such a benefit may be traced back to the 
contract between Eli Whitney and the United States Government to develop 
a system of manufacturing interchangeable parts for the production of 
firearms. The techniques deve loped then were soon picked up by civilian 
industry. These developments were basic to the continuation of the in-
dustrial revolution at that time and mass production techniques were 
furthered by Whitney's work . Although this development would have come 
sooner of later- -it did come sooner because of a military requirement, 
with the resultant benefits to society at large. 
A more recent example of a benefit with a transferance value from 
military research and development to the civilian sector is the develop-
ment of the electronic computer . The present computer industry is the 
direct result of Army sponsored research during World War II. Computers 
were initially developed to calculate trajectory and firing tables because 
these calculations exceeded the capabilities of the men and machines of 
9Herbert E. Striner, ~~··Defense Spending and the U.S. Economy, 
Staff Paper, ORO - SP-57, Operations Research Office, The Johns Hopkins 
University, Vol. I, June 1959, p. 16. 
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the Ballistic Research Laboratories of the Ordnance Department, United 
States Army. As a result of a need for greater speed and accuracy in 
these computations, a contract was made with the University of Pennsyl-
vania to develop an appropriate type of electronic computer. By 1946, 
a machine was produced and installed on the Ballistic Research Labora-
tories. Today the computer industry is rapidly expanding and machines 
are being applied to problems of industry, universities, and government 
agencies . In addition to increasing productivity, work once regarded 
as impractical to perform becomes a daily occurrence with the use of 
the computer. The actual pay-off of the original $400,000 investment 
in research and development in 1942 by Army Ordnance cannot be measured 
since so many fields are affected, directly and indirectly. 10 
Even a later example is the adaptation of the research performed 
to develop the KC-135, an aerial refueling cargo vehicle to the nation's 
first jet airliner, the present Boeing 707. It is no more than a modi-
fied KC-135 which is used in support of the B- 52 weapon system. Similarly, 
the current expenditures in research and development for modern weapons 
systems have far-reaching implications f or advancements in science and 
technology in the civilian sector. The benefits cannot be calculated 
at this time but the advances will surely have a dramatic effect on 
our way of life. 
Primary Benefits of Military Research 
Apart from these benefits, the number one benefit to be derived 
from military research and development is a defense posture which is in 
consonance with our national policy. It is doubtful that our scientist -
10Ibid., p. 19. 
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engineers resource base would be as large as it is without the incentive 
of military r esearch and development. To assert that this limited r e-
source i s being diverted f r om the civilian economy t o it s detriment and 
may be a pot ential cause of la gg ing employment and a deterrent to in-
c reas ed productivity is to convey the idea that the quantitative costs 
and side effects of having the government do more of our shopping are 
known. A bet t er understanding of these economic problems and implications 
for res ea rch and development and military budgets a s a whole along with 
the entire complex of related domestic economic problems is required . 
" .. . let us not be so bemused by good but incomplete economic theory 
about these indirect costs that we run undue risks with national 
security. ooll 
Th e Need for Compe tent Personnel 
Still in the area of the effective utilization of personnel and 
facilities are the policies related to how much research and development 
the government itself will conduct with its own personne l and within its 
own fac iliti es and how much it will contract out. The latter is favored 
by industry. In a measure this is r e lated to the type of research in-
volved. This has been classified und e r five basic categories:l2 
l . Fundamental research 
2. Supporting research or exploratory development 
llHitch and McKean, p . 81. 
12u.s. House of Repres enta tives , Subcommittee of the Co11111ittee on 
Government Op e rations, Sys tems Development and Management, Part I, 87th 
Cong. 2d Sess . (Washington , D.C ., 1962), p. 204. From the Report to the 
Presiden t on Government Contracting for Research and Development, April 30, 
1962. This report was prepared by David E. Bell, Director, Bureau of the 
Budget, and is known as the "Be ll Report . " It has been made a part of 
these Hearings and is reproduced in its entirety on pp. 191-337. Cited 
hereafter as the "Bell Report." 
3. Feasibility studies, operations analysis and technical 
advice 
4. Development and engineering of products, processes or 
systems 
5. Test and evaluation activities 
These areas may overlap and there is no clear-cut method of 
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deciding whether to contract out or use government personnel or facili-
ties for any of these particular types of activities. A major criteria 
for deciding this issue should be based on "getting the job done effec-
tively and efficiently with due regard to the long term strength of the 
nation's scientific and technical resources. 1113 
The management of research and development programs is difficult 
for the government--regardless of whether the work is being accomplished 
contractually or organically in government facilities . Decisions con-
cerning the type of work to be done, when, by whom, and at what cost 
are decisions which must be made by government officials. Fu 11- time, 
competent government officials responsible to the President and Congress 
must be in a position to manage these programs and evaluate the results 
therefrom. These basic management funcations cannot be transferred to 
the contractor if proper accountability for the performance of public 
functions and for public use of funds is to be maintained. This does 
not imply that detailed supervision of each research and development 
task by government officials is necessary- - delegation of responsibility 
for this detailed administration to those performing the work is essen-
tial to its efficient execution. However, recent years have seen 
instances, particularly in the Defense Department, where contract 
employees have been permitted to exercise functions which belong to 
top government officials in research and development activities. 14 
l3rbid. , p. 214. 
l4lbid.' p. 215. 
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Recognizing this, it is essential that the government have the 
best qualified technical and scientific personnel to manage research 
programs. Due to the relatively low compensation received by government 
personnel as compared to those in private industry, it has been difficult 
to obtain and maintain the managerial competence which the government 
needs to manage its research and development programs.l5 
The need for higher pay for government personnel performing these 
tasks has been recognized. Higher average starting salaries, and greater 
annual salary growth over a longer period of time are offered by private 
organizations. Consequently, the average employee in private industry 
will have a highe r maximum salary expectancy. The difference in favor 
of the average industrial employee is so g r eat , that at a ny time during 
employment, the average emp l oyee working for a government contractor 
having a bachelor's degree can expect to receive a considerably higher 
salary than the average gove rnment employee with a doctor's degree. 
Further advantages of private employees are ref lected in cash bonuses, 
stock options, etc. This has resulted in the necessity of paying 
scientists and engineers working on purely civilian efforts salaries 
comparable to those being paid to the others doing work in government 
programs . 16 This raises the cost of research and development for all 
purpos es. 
lSibid ., p. 280. 
l6Hols t, p. 163. 
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Non-Profit Organizations 
Further, in relation to salaries, the creation of non-profit 
organizations under government auspices for research purposes is 
viewed with great criticism by some members of Congress . 
These non-profit organizations contract either 
entirely or almost entirely with the federal government. 
The employees of such organizations are paid indirectly by 
the taxpayers to the same extent as employees under civil 
service are paid directly by the taxpayers. The pertinent 
major difference is that their pay is higher. Laws have been 
enacted by the Congress to regulate salaries of civil service 
employees. No such laws protect the taxpayers from the payment 
of excessive salaries to the employees of non-profit organi-
zations with government contracts. To a considerable extent, 
the use of contracts with non- profit organizations is merely 
a subterfuge to avoid the restrictions of civil service 
salary scales.l7 
To promote operations research and other analytical services by 
contract to the Air Force, the RAND C9rporation was established after 
World War II. Other organizations modeled after RAND to provide similar 
services have also been established. Another type of organizational 
setup, generally not-for-profit but sometimes for profit, has been created 
to furnish the government with "systems engineering and technical direction" 
and to provide other services. Typical examples are the Aerospace Corpor-
ation, the MITRE Corporation, the Systems Development Corporation, and 
the Planning Research Corporation. The Air Force is the major user of 
the non-profit type of organization--predominantly the Air Force Systems 
Command which is the major research organization of the Air Force. Prob-
ably there will be greater use of more specially created , non-profit 
corporations to fill this technical gap of "in-house " (government) capa-
bility. 
17u.s. Congress, House of Representatives Committee on Appropriations, 
De partment of Defense Appropriation Bill, 1962, 89th Gong., lst Sess {Wash-
ington, D. C. , 1961), p. 53. 
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With the advent of missile deve lopment, the Air Force found 
itself unable to cope with the complex technological problems of these 
programs due to the lack of qualified officers and government employees, 
although they had been successful in providing technical guidance and 
expert managerial ability in the development of aeronautical systems. 
It therefore became necessary, as the tempo of ballistic missile pro-
grams and electronics and space technology increased, to turn to the 
use of non-profit corporations to help provide the technical direction 
and systems engineering which these new technologies and their increas-
ingly complex weapon systems required. The establishment of these 
organizations has provided an important means for the formation of a 
competent research organization for specific tasks more rapidly than 
could have been possible within the less flexible administrative re-
qui rements of the government .18 
As an examp le, the Space Technology Laboratories of the Thompson 
Ramo Wooldridge Corporation was engaged to provide this capability for 
the Ballistics Missile Division of the Air Research and Development 
Command of the Air Force . However, the corporate ties of the Space 
Technology Laboratories with Thompson Ramo Wooldridge, which was pro-
ducing hardware for the Air Force, caused other industrial competitors 
t o complain; and this culminated in a congressional investigation and 
orders to the Air Force to change it s procedures in this area . This 
resulted in the formation of Aerospace Corporation, a new non-profit 
organization, not participating in any type of production, to fulfill 
this fu nction for the Ballistics Missile Division on all new systems and 
l8 "Systems Command Given New Functions," Aviation Week and Space 
Technology, September 25, 1961, p. 76. 
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technical areas under their control. Similarly, Mitre Corporat i on 
was organized to provide this technical capabi lity for the electronics 
area, an essential adjunct to weapons systems development.l9 
Recognizing this l ack of technical capability, the Air Force in 
past years has made major efforts to develop more technically trained 
officers with an elaborate advanced technical education program in 
universities, but the supp l y has been unable to keep up with the in-
creasing requirements of the Air Force through an increasingly broad 
portion of the technical spectrum. Further, a steady stream of Lhese 
technically educated officers, seasoned with Air Force operating exper-
ience, has flowed out of the service into industry . 20 Consequently, 
between its increasing requ i rements and stead a t trition of experienced 
officers and the low pay offered by the government to civilian sden-
tists and engineers, the Air Force has never been able to develop an 
in-house capabi l ity beyond the barest of minimums . Unable to develop 
its own capability, it was inevitable that the Air Force wou l d have to 
devise a means to manage the ever-increasing complex of technical 
direction and systems engineering required in the development of modern 
weapons systems.2 l And despite the continuing criticisms from Congress 
and indu stry, it appea r s that the non- profit type or ganization will 
remain a ''way of l ife" for t he Air Force in the area of technical direc-
tion and systems engineering. 
l9rbid . 
20Ibid., p. 75. 
21ster l ing J. Livingston , ' 'Weapon System Contract ing, "~ 
Business Review, XXXVII (Ju l y-August 1959 ) , 85 . 
Competition between Indus try and 
Non-Prof it Organizations 
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Industry has comp lained of the competition of the government-
es t ab l ished non-profit orga nizations. The Aeros pace Corporation in 
1961 had a volume of a pproxima t e ly $65 million business f r om the Air 
Force, with $30 million allocated to sala ries, equ ipment, a nd overhead 
and the remainder used for direct engineering costs of s pecific pro-
jects. Along with the comp l aint of current compe tit ion, is the fear 
of i ndu stry that ultimately the Aerospa ce Corporation will ge t into 
manufactu ring and will have a competitive advantage due to their r e -
search ac tivi t ie s . A further comp laint has been voiced concerning the 
higher pa y scales be ing offered to scientist s and the l osses of such 
personne l to Ae rospace Corporation from some industrial organizations. 22 
The volume of Defense Department alloca tions to t he non-profit 
organizations for research has been inc reasing steadily. The amounts 
programmed for expenditure with non-profit organizations were 
$112,484,000 in FY 1963, $136,292,000 in FY 1963, and $152,702,000 in 
FY 1964 . Expend itures with Aeros pace Corporation alone were $68,095,000 
in FY 1963 and $74,210,000 in FY 1964 ,23 
Maximum Transfer of Benefits to the 
Civilian Sector 
In addition to its complaints concerning the increasing use of 
non-profit or gan izati ons , industry feels that the government shou ld 
22Ri chard F. Rope r, '~issile Managers. Aerospace Corp. Stirs 
Critici sm of Pe ntagon ' s Use of Non-Profit Firms, " Wall Street Journal, 
Decembe r 6, 1961 , p. 1 . 
23u.s. Congress, House, Subcommitt ee on Appropriations Hearings , 
Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, Part 6, 88th Congres s , 
1st Sess. (Washington, D. C., 1963), p. 140. 
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contract out for more of its research work. Industry 1 s stand is that 
the government should be in a strong position to manage its research 
and development programs through the use of capable and responsible 
government personnel. However, it asserts that the government should 
manage only and contract for most, if not all, actual research. Manage-
ment of research would not require staffs as large as those required 
for actual research. 
This would enable greater use of the private sector as opposed 
to government-conducted research in its own facilities by its own em-
ployees. The view here is that this would enable maximum transfer of 
benefits from federally-sponsored research to the civilian economy. 
Recognition of this need for transfer is reflected in the establishment 
by the Atomic Energy Commission of the Office of Civilian Applications 
and of the National Space Agency of a similar office for the purpose of 
transferring findings and technology from government-sponsored research 
and development to civilian applications. This, however, is a distrac-
tion from the primary missions of military, space, or other objectives. 
The wide scope of possible civilian applications make these efforts 
problematical.24 
Maximum transfer of secondary benefits from military or other 
government - sponsored research may be best achieved when a contractor 
is conducting the research in fields related to his regular commercial 
endeavors. Alt e rnatively, if the government is conducting the research 
in-house or in a specially created institute or other quasi-public organi-
zation, direct transfer of benefits to the private sector is not possible 
24Holst, p. 164 . 
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and any transfer will involve intermediate steps. Further, the incentive 
of opportunity for gain is absent, as are the means of produ c tion, dis-
tribution, and sale. Therefore, if the transfer of benefits t o the 
private sector is an objective, the choice of the organization, whether 
government or private, should be influenced by these considerations. 
Moreover, since it is desirable to transfer findings and tech-
nology t o the private economy from government-sponsored research, 
restrictions on the use of such knowledge should be held to a minimum. 
Providing the work being done for the government is well-performed, any 
other advantages accruing to the contractor because of early involvement 
in the work of the government should be quite incidental. The opportunity 
to obtain such an advantage might very well be held out as an incentive 
for efficient contractors to undertake the project in the first place. 
If such work is opened fairly to all interested competitors, there 
should be no question as to the equity of the transfer of such know how; 
rather it should be encouraged in the public interest. 25 
Patent Policies 
Similarly, there has been widespread di scussion concerning what 
policy should be followed concerning the ownership of patents resulting 
from government-sponsored research and development. Is it in the public 
interest for the government to take title to these patents, d a ta, and 
copyrights ? Government justification for retaining ownership of patents 
is shown by the slogan, "What the government pays for it should own." 
Expressed differently, this statement asserts that because public funds 
25Ibid.' p . 165. 
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were used in the creation of the invention, then it should rightly be 
the property of the public. 
On the other hand, industry asks these questions. What is it 
that the government sought and paid for? Was it a weapon system or a 
patent? Did the government receive what it contracted for? Is the 
government entitled to ask for secondary or derivative benefits? Even 
more important, if the government takes title, will it promote the public 
interest? Industry contends that the private ownership of patents has 
led to their widespread use and has resulted in benefits which serve 
the government and the private aim of full empl oyment, along with a 
continuing flow of new and better products, services, and production 
methods. 26 
Opposition to the view that industry shou ld take title to patents 
resulting from government-sponsored research is based on the thesis 
that firms participating in this development obtain most of this work 
in a non-competitive atmosphere, without the inherent risks of truly 
private enterprise, but still want to use the patent system to obtain 
future control of new science and technology. The entitlement to these 
patents is considered a factor in the promotion of monopoly by some 
members of Congress. '~othing less than the futu r e of our f r ee, com-
petitive enterprise system is at stake."27 
The Senate Subcommittee on Monopoly has asserted that most of the 
government-generated scientific knowledge is being locked up in the hands 
of a few large corporations. Other corporations, usually the sma ller 
26Ibid . 
27u.s. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Monopoly of the Select 
Committee on Small Business, Economic and Legal Problems of Government 
Patent Policies, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (Washington, D.C. 1963), p. III. 
104 
ones and other industries, are being denied this knowledge for immediate 
and future use. Further, many of the discoveries, major and minor, are 
not being exploited by anyone--this includes cases in which both govern-
ment agencies and industrial corporations hold patents which are not 
being put to use. Key government agencies, as well as corporations, 
have taken control of inventions that have resulted from the use of 
public funds. Without the proper institutional arrangements, the effec-
tive dissemination of the government ' s $15 billion a year research effort 
is not possible throughout society--to all companies, in all industries, 
regardless of location.28 
The patent policies for the different government agencies vary. 
The Department of Defense, in its research and development contracts, 
allows the contractor to retain title to any patents resulting from the 
project with the government receiving a license to use the invention for 
government purposes. However, the corporation has exclusive use of the 
development for commercial purposes . This is known as the "license" 
policy. This differs from the " title" policy under which the National 
Space Agency operates. Under this concept, the government takes title 
to the patent and licenses corporations to use them on a royalty-free 
basis. The Atomic Energy Commission also uses this concept. 29 
Some members of Congress have considered modifying the law per-
taining to the patent policy of the National Space Agency from the " title" 
to the " license" concept . 30 This has brought some protest from the 
28Ibid., p. l. 
29Lee E. Preston, "Patent Rights Under Federal Rand D Contracts," 
Harvard Business Review, Vol. XLI (September-October, 1963), 10. 
3Du.s. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, 
Amending the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 with Respect to 
Property Rights in Invent ions, 87th Gong., 2d Sess (Washington, D.C., 
1962)' p . l. 
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Subcommittee on Monopoly, which asserts that the unexpressed reason 
for this change is that the National Space Agency fee ls at a competitive 
disadvantage for the attention of contractors who may also be pe rforming 
research for the Department of Defense. The Subcommittee feels that the 
proper course of action is to alter the policy of the Defense Depart-
ment to the "title" policy.31 
Need for a Single Patent Policy 
Two major steps are advocated by this group to assure the mosL 
effective transfer of developments from government-sponsored research 
to the civilian sector. The first step is to have a common government 
policy which will require all agencies and depar tments of the federal 
government to take title to all patents on inventions resulting from 
government-financed research and development. The second and accompany-
ing step is the establishment of an "Inventions Development Authority." 
This agency would have as its ma j or functions the collection of scientific 
information, its analysis, and its development, including the collection 
of royalties on government-owned patents. Without such an agency, the 
retention of title by the government to a patent would not be very useful, 
for patents thus retained but not put Lo use wou l d have no transfer value 
insofar as the civilian economy is concerned. For one of the current 
problems is the co l lection of dust by patents resulting from government-
funded research, either in the files of the pertinent government agency 
or the drawers of a developing contractor. A recent study indicated 
that only about 13 percent of privately owned patents resulting from 
31Government Patent Policies, p . 2. 
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federa lly-financed research and deve l opment had ever been licensed fo r 
use . 32 
It follows th e n that there is no systematic and ef fici ent effo rt 
being made to exploit the ever- expanding flow of technical information. 
The l imi t ed efforts being made to distribute information originating in 
government research projects is being handled mostly by the Armed 
Services Technica l Information Agency and the Office of Technica l Ser-
vices of the Commerce De partment . These two agencies prepare and publi sh 
abstracts of research, but the effort s are rathe r limit ed. It is for 
this reason that the creation of an "Inventions Deve lopment Authority" 
is r equired for the purpose of developing and exploiting inventi ons 
from public r esearch. This would be accomplished by making this tech-
oical information available to all of industry, rather than ha v ing it 
remain in the hands of the limit ed numb e r of large corporations engaged 
in government r esearch. Furth er, by charging r oya lties for the use of 
government- owned pat ents , part of the heavy costs of public research 
could be defrayed.33 
The Subcommittee on Monopoly fi rmly believes: 
By taking title to pat ents where its resources r ep r e-
se nt the prima r y contribution and by es tablishing a new 
independent agency to exploit the technical information 
and inventions generated by federally- financed programs, 
the Government, meaning essentially the Congress since 
legislation will be necessary, could insure that the fruits 
of our $15 billion a year in r esearch expend itures inure 
to the benefit of the general public.34 
32Ibid .• p. 34. 
33Ibid., p. 21. 
34Ibid, 
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In summary, there are several impacts on society which may 
result from the developments of government-sponsored research, depend-
ing on how quickly and freely they are made available to the economy . 
The patent policy of the various government agencies do have a bearing 
on these impacts. It can be stated that there are benefits involved 
in giving title to patents to contractors performing research and 
development for the government. A stimulus is provided to companies 
for doing res earch and development, hence affecting res ource use and 
development. When the government performs research in its own labora-
tories, the government, of course, retains title to any resulting 
developments. In the former instance under current conditions, the 
transfer to the civilian sector is much simpler and faster, since, in 
addition to the fees, the company receives an added know-how acquired 
on government contracts and also secures other competitive and financial 
benefits through a strong patent position and unrestricted commercial 
rights. On the other hand, there are some non-b eneficial aspects of 
permitting a contractor to take title to patents developed in government 
research. The public may be excluded from or charged again for the use 
of products or processes to curb competition and foster monopoly because 
of the inclination of the Armed Services to contract with the larger 
companies. Although the government ' s non-exclusive licenses permit ful-
fillment of requirements anywhere, it is only natural that the Services 
tend to deal with those who have already performed satisfactory research 
work. 35 
35striner, p . 31 . 
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In view of the expansion and changes occurring in all areas of 
federal research, it appears that government policy pertaining to 
patents will requ ire some changes too . The answer is by no means 
simple, and much experimentation will be necessary to find an answer. 
On balance, experimentation toward expansion of the title policy with 
re s pect to federal research seems warranted. For the more widespread 
and the freer the dissemination of the results of public research t o 
all potential users, the more effective will be its use . This, too , 
would pr ovide the ad va ntage of greater competition and economic growth. 
In addition to the impact on ou r public policies, the great 
requirements for research and development are placing unusually high 
demands on the nation ' s pool of scientific and engineering talent. 
Competition for scientists and engineers, as indicated before, is be-
coming more intense. In addition to the more efficient use of scientific 
and technical personnel currently available, the expansion of education 
and training in these areas is extremely urgent. The university is of 
course the major participant in the education of engineers and scientists. 
Thes e additional training requirements, plus the amount of r eliance the 
government has placed on universiti es for the accomplishment of research, 
have had major consequences for our institutions of higher education. 
The total impac t on a university can be sizable when federal funds pro-
vide more than half of the research budget, as may be the case. It is 
to the problems of providing adequate numbers of scientific and engineer-
ing personnel and the impact of federal research funds on the universiti es 
to which the next chapter will be devoted. 
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CHAPTER VI 
MANPOWER, EDUCATION, AND THE UNIVERSITY 
Requirements for Engineers and Scientists 
Research and development requirements have placed extremely high 
demands on our pool of scientific and engineering manpower. These 
demands are related to the trend of the last ten years of increased 
federal r equirements for research and development, particularly in the 
defense area for the development of modern weapons systems. In addition 
to the increased manpower requirements, which must be obtained almost 
entirely through our institutions of higher education, the federal gov-
ernment has come to rely heavily on the nation's universities and 
colleges to conduct increasing amounts of research a nd development work 
in defense as well as other areas. These two factors are having diverse 
effects on American universities. 
Aside from the requirements of increased federal research and 
development, the newer industries such as those dealing in aircraft, 
missiles, and e lectronics supporting the weapons systems effort require 
a new kind of personnel mix, needing a higher percentage of scientists 
and engineers. Whereas the older type mass production industries re-
quire large numbers of production workers, the newer industries require 
roughly a one-to-one ratio between production workers and the scientist-
engineer group and this proportion of scientist-engineers is steadily 
increasing. 1 This also intensifies the competition for these personnel. 
1Bell Report, p . 204. 
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The National Science Foundation indicates there is a 6 percent 
annual increase in the supply of scientists and engineers, while the 
number participating in research and development is increasing by 10 
percent each year. Table 14 reflects the growth of scientists and 
engineers engaged in research and development from 1954 through 1960. 
The development of sufficient numbers of scientists and enginee rs is 
therefore very urgent for the welfare of the American economy. 
Table 14. Scientists and engineers in research and development by 
sector 1954, 1958, and 1960a 
Sector 1954 1958 1960 
Total 223,200 327,100 387,000 
Federal governmentb 29,500 40' 200 41' 800 
Indus tryc 164' 100 239,500 286,200 
Coll eges and universitiesa 25,200 42,000 52,000 
Other non-profit institutionsa 4,400 5,400 7,000 
aData consist of number of full-time employees plus the full-time 
equivalent of part-time employees. 
bLimited to civilian personnel. 
CJnclude professional research personnel employed at research centers 
administered by organizations under contract with federal agencies. 
Source: U.S. National Science Foundation, 12th Annual Report (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1962), p. 140 . 
2lbid.' p. 208. 
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The economy relies on specialists in many fields, and there are 
urgent requirements for additional trained personnel in all the fields, 
but the technological challenges of the day place the heaviest demands 
on engineering, mathematics, and the physical sciences.3 
Shortages of scientific and engineering talent is manifested by 
the intense competition among members of industry, government agencies, 
non-profit research organizations, and universiti es for the services 
of we ll-qualified people possessi ng these talents. This was mentioned 
briefly in the last chapter in regard to the government's inability to 
obtain sufficient personnel to conduct its own research and the neces-
sity of forming non-profi t research organizations for this purpose.4 
The competition fo r scientific and engineering personnel may 
become more intense. The National Science Foundation points out that 
requirements for these talents will increase by about 85 percent between 
1959 and 1970. An increased demand from 1,096,000 to about 2,032,000 
is projected. For engineers, the increase projected is 90 percent--
from 783,000 in 1959 to 1,484,000 in 1970 . For scientists, a growth 
of 75 percent is expected over the ll year period--from 313,000 in 
1959 to 548,000 in 1970 . 5 
3u.s. White House, the President ' s Science Advisory Committe, 
Meeting Manpower Needs in Science and Technology, Report Number One: 
Graduate Training in Engineering, Mathematics, and Physical Sciences 
(Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 4. Cited hereafter as Graduate Training 
in Engineering, Mathematics, and Physical Sciences, 
4see Chapte r V, p. 97. 
5u.s. Department of Labor, The Long Range Demand for Scientific 
and Technical Personnel (Washington, D.C., 1961), p. 27. Cited hereafter 
as Long Range Demand. 
112 
The increase from 1,096,000 in 1959 to 2,032,000 in 1970 means 
an increase of an average of 85,000 scientists and engineers yearly is 
required. In addition to this number, there will be requirements to 
replace those in these professions who retire, die, or transfer to 
other fields of work. It is a ntici pated that this will average approxi-
mately 21 ,000 a year during the 1960 ' s. Thus, there will be a total 
average requirement of 106,000 new scientific and engineering personnel 
each year--85,000 for new requirements and 21,000 for replacements. 
The requi r ements for engineers is the gr eatest, for it is estimated 
that the demand wil l be for 81,000 new engineers each year. Also re-
quired during this period are an aver age of 25,000 new scientis t s each 
yea r . Experience has shown tha t about 23 percent of all new en t ra nt s 
into the engineering fie ld are without engineering degrees and there is 
a loss of abou t 4 percent of all engineer i ng graduates to other fields. 
Based on this da t a, there will s till be a yearly aver age requirement 
of 72,000 engineering graduates during this period. 
This estimate of 72,000 is well above the actual number of engin-
eering graduates in 1960 whi ch tota ll ed 37,808 bachelors, 7,159 master's , 
and 786 doctor's degr ees awarded. An 80 percent increase in require-
ments for all fi e ld s of engineering i s pr oj ec ted between 1959 and 1969, 
assumi ng that the necessary educational faci l i ties and facu lty a r e 
available. Based on this projection there would be an annual average 
output of 58,000 engineers making a total of 631,000 fo r the ll - year 
period. This does not meet the projected demand of 72,000 per annum. 6 
The r e is further evidence that the projected demand does not 
6Ibid., p. 33. 
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appear to he possible of fulfillment w1thin the projected time s pan. 
In 1963 the number of engineering students receiving bachelor degrees 
in engineering declined for the fourth straight year, although there 
appears to he some evidence of slowing or reversal of this trend. One 
promising factor was the increase in the number of doctor's and 
master's degrees awarded in the 1962-63 academic year. However, the 
engi neer's Joint Council, through its president, stat ed that these 
increases were not great enough to insure replacement of retiring 
faculty and to provide upgrading of aculties and to satisfy the needs 
of government and industry for engineers educated to a high level of 
competence.7 
If the projected demand is to he met, the proportion of fresh-
men enrolling in engineering needs to increase, retention rates improve, 
transfers into engineering schools rise, or some combination of these 
factors take place. If none of these occur, then some of the deficit 
might he made up hy an influx of a greater number of persons without 
engineering degrees than the 23 percent that has been allowed ahove.B 
A similar situation exists in the scientist requirements. 
Although an annual average output from our universities is project ed 
at 80,000 degrees in various fields of science, past experience reveals 
that about 70 percent of those with science degrees do not obtain work 
in one of the fields of science. To meet a projected requirement of 
25,000 scientists per year during the 1960's would require an average 
annual output of 83,000 science graduates which roughly approximates 
7
"Classroom and Campus," New York Times, November 24, 1963, Sect. 
IV, p. 7. 
81ong Range Demand, p . 33. 
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the 80,000 anticipated output. However, thi s figure does not take into 
account the differences in the supply and demand situation among the 
various science specialties and among the different levels of education. 
Employers' demands for advanced degrees indicate there may be a consider-
able gap between the supply of and the demand for these personnel. In 
addition, the supply-demand situation in some science specialties may 
be far different than that indicated for all scientists as a group.9 
The Need for Quality and Advanced Training 
Apart from the numbers of scientists and engineers required to 
support the government's military, economic, and social objectives, the 
President's Science Advisory Committee in a report t o the President, 
voiced concern about the nation's needs for professional personnel 
with high ability and advanced training. The Committee urged the 
adoption of four major goals in engineering, mathematics , and the 
physical sciences, as follows:lO 
1 . To increase the awards of doctor's degrees to reach 7500 
per year by 1970 (Table 15). 
2. To increase the number of students who receive a full year 
of graduate training to reach 30,000 annually by 1970 
(Table 15). 
3. To strengthen existing centers of educational excellence 
in engineering, ma t hematics, and physical sciences, and 
deve l ow new ones. 
4. Promote wider geographic distribution of centers of 
educational excel l ence. 
The increased number of graduate students related to the first two 
goals will require an increas in the present capacities of first-rate 
9rbid., p. 34 . 
10Graduate Training in Engineering, Mathematics, and Physical 
Sciences, p. 6. 
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Table 15. Numbers achieved and goals for the future in graduate edu-
cation in engineering, mathematics, and the physical sciencesa 
Achieved Goals 
1950 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 
First-year graduate 
studentsb 17 20 30 
(22)C 35 38 40 
Master ' s degree recip-
ientsd 9 12 13 16 24 27 30 
(l5)c 
Graduate students beyond 
first yearb 17 20 24 31 36 41 
(22)c 
Doctor's degree recip-
ients 2.1 2.9 3.4 3.9 4 .7 5.7 7.5 
(3.9)c 
aNumber of persons {thousands). 
bFull-time students, defined as students engaged in at least 3/4 of the 
normal work-load. 
cNumbers in parentheses give expected 1964 levels, based on continuation 
of past t rends . 
dTaken as roughly equivalent to the satisfactory completion of one year's 
full-time graduate study. 
Source: U.S. White House, The President's Advisory Committee, Graduate 
~ng in Engineering , Mathematics, and Physical Sciences {Washing ton, 
D.C., 1962), p. 7 . 
educational institut i ons. The attainment of the third goal is therefore 
essential if the first two are to be achieved. This will require the 
more effective use of recognized centers of excellence and in encouraging 
and making possible their expansion. However, this alone is insufficient, 
for a further requirement will be to recognize and develop new "centers 
of excellence. " 11 
llThe President's Science Advis ory Committee considers a center of 
educational exce llence as " . . . one that offers first-rate educational 
training may comprise an ent ire institution, a department, a group of 
faculty, or one distinguished man." 
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The fourth goal will allow increased enrollments to be more 
evenly distributed geographically. Centers of excellence more evenly 
distributed will be able to serve all geographic areas more effectively. 
These educational centers serving more regions and states would stimu-
late and spread economic progress because recent experience indicates 
that new industry has a tendency to concentrate around leading institu-
tions of science and technology. 
The attainment of these four goals will require a major input 
of funds, bothfede~aland non-federal. The limitations to their achieve-
ment are--availability of student support, numbers of faculty, and edu-
cational facilities . Students with family responsibilities, faced with 
a choice between reasonable starting salary and a much smaller stipend 
which they may receive to pursue graduate studies, often decide they 
cannot afford to select graduate study. Those who do choose graduate 
study, must often combine it with a job and extend their study over many 
years. The Committee recommends that stipends be sufficient in number 
and size to attract more students into full-time graduate study, thereby 
allowing a shorter interval to obtain a doctor ' s degree and making them 
available for full-time professional work at an aarlier date. 
Another requirement is increased funds for buildings and equip-
ment. Effective graduate training requires these facilities if the 
goals to accommodate increasing numbers of students are to be met. 
Because the lead time is long and present facilities are inadequate to 
meet increased student enrol lments, the provision of funds for this pur-
pose is the first order of business toward attainment of the proposed 
goals . 
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The achievement of these goals must not be permitted to distort 
the broad responsibilities of the universities for education at under-
graduate and graduate levels, and in all academic fields, including 
the s ocial science, arts, humanities, and sciences. To prevent such 
distortions, the universities must be reimbursed, through an effective 
program, for the increased costs of increased graduate training in the 
engineering, mathematical and physical sciences. The program must 
operate to supplement, but not replace, funds from other sources of 
support. 12 
To achieve the aforementioned goals., the Committee recommends 
a national program which would provide:l3 
l. Adequate financial support for all full-time graduate 
students in these three fields; 
2. Funds to cover the full costs of graduate education in 
engineering, mathematics and physical sciences; 
3. Funds for physical facilities and equipment used; 
4. Funds for developing new centers of education. 
It is suggested that the federal gove rnment take the lead and 
perhaps provide 60 percent of the support for this program. The remainder 
would come from the states, industry, the foundations, and private donors. 
The federal government has become the principal consumer of the output 
of engineering, mathematics and physical sciences schools. Large govern-
ment proj ects have greatly increased the demand for professional man-
power. However, it is insufficient for the government to establish 
agencies and let contracts to accomplish these projects. It must insure 
12Graduate Training in Engineering, Mathematics, and Physical 
Sciences, p. 6. 
13Ibid. 
that high caliber and well-trained people are available to work in 
these agencies and under these contracts. Therefore, the federal 
government must take the initiative and the central responsibility 
for supporting this effort. l4 
Magnitude of Federal Expenditures on Universities 
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The current federal expenditures for research and development 
at universities and colleges, plus the support required by the proposed 
program for expanding graduate study and facilities are indeed large. 
The costs for this program are projected to grow to $760 million for 
the year 1970 (Tab le 16). The proposed 60 percent contribution by the 
government, mainly through the National Science Foundation, for the 
graduate training program adds to an already tremendous participation 
by the government in funds expenditures with ou r universities and 
colleges for basic and applied research as well as for development. 
The magnitude of these expenditures can be gleaned from Table 17. 
It is to be noted from Table 17 that the Department of Defens e ranks 
third in its expenditures for research and development with ed ucationa l 
institutions; however, much of the expenditures of the Atomic Energy 
Commission and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration are 
for national securi ty purposes, which indicates that expend itures for 
weapons development exceed by far the expenditures for any other single 
purpose. In any discussion related to the impact of federal research 
funds on universities, it is difficult to separate the impact of ex pend-
itures for weapons research and development per se from the cumulative 
14Ibid., p. 14. 
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Table 16. Total cost of recommended national program for graduate 
training in EMP, through fiscal year 197oa,b 
Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year Fiscal year 
1964 1966 1968 1970 
Student supportc $185 $230 $260 $285 
Cost of educatiand 145 180 200 225 
Construction and equip-
ment 250 250 250 250 
Total $580 $660 $710 $760 
aMi llions of dollars from al l sectors. 
bNot including funds for research that is conducted as an integral 
part of graduate education. 
crncludes student support in the form of research assistantships 
paid out of research grants or contracts. Stipends cover cost of 
living on an 11-month basis, including allowances for dependents. 
clncludes tuition and additional allowances for faculty salaries, 
l aboratory operations, building maintenance, administrative services. 
Source: U.S. White House, the President 1 s Advisory Committee, 
~te Training in Engineering . Mathematics, and Physical Sciences 
(Washington, D.C., 1962), p. 11. 
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Table 17. R&D obligations to educational institutions, by selected 
agency, fiscal year 1962 (estimated) 
Total, all agencies 
Atomic Energy Com-
mission 
Department of Health, 
Education & Welfare 
Department of Defense 
Amount 
(millions of 
dollars) 
$1, 283 
335 
324 
313 
National Aeronautics & 
Space Administration 180 
National Science Founda-
tion 86 
All other agencies 45 
Percentage 
distribu-
tions 
100 
26 
25 
24 
14 
Obligations as 
percentage of 
agency ' s R&D 
obligations 
12 
32 
54 
5 
13 
81 
Source : U.S. National Science Foundation, Feder al Funds for Science, 
xr:-1963 (Washington, D. C., 1963), p. 20. 
effect of all federally sponsored research. Since research expenditures 
for defense purposes make up the bulk of the expenditures, no attempt at 
separating this impact will be made since the basic effect of all types 
of federal research is similar.l5 
Effects on Teaching 
Many feel that the stress on research work and graduate training 
is causing undergraduate work to suffer. It is asserted that the expendi -
tures for government research, student support programs, and the comit-
ment to post-graduate support of virtually the entire source of new 
15see Table 12, Federal expenditures for Research and Develop-
ment for fiscal years 1953-1963, Chap. V. 
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scientific manpower are distorting the educational system. 16 By absorb-
ing the best graduates, government research projects are leaving many 
universities dependent on the lowest caliber graduate students to perform 
the role of instructing undergraduates. There is evidence that the 
support made ava ilable through fe llowships, grants, and sponsored re-
search are making it extremely difficult to find teaching assistants who 
have traditionally been one of the major methods of teacing under-
graduates. 17 
Further, the "research outlook" of federal programs is changing 
the academic scientist ' s job by de-emphasizing teaching. Furthermore, 
the emphasis on research tends to increase class sizes and thereby 
reduce student-teacher contacts and helps inc r ease faculty needs, by 
r edu ci ng each faculty member ' s availability for c lass work.l8 
Federal research funds make up a substantial part of the oper-
ating income of universities. The sheer volume of money affects what 
they teach, how they teach, and the quality of instruction. Apart from 
the effects of the federal funds that they receive, they are also in-
fluenced by the total volume of federal research and development expendi-
tures. For examp l e, federal fu nds have created a demand for engineering 
and scientific manpower which has drawn many university teachers and 
potential teachers into industrial research. These effects are not 
temporary and will probably become more powerful.l9 
l6Edmund K. Faltermeyer, "Cash for Colleges," Wall Street Journal, 
December 6, 1961, p. 1. 
l7Federal Influ ence Distorts Education, Nation's Business, Vol.Sl, 
No. 3 (March 1963), p. 31. 
lBrbid., P. 32. 
19charl es V. Kidd, American Universities and Federal Research, 
(Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard Uni versity Press, 1959), 
p. 39. 
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Freedom of the University 
Another issue having long term effects is whether it is possible 
to have strong free productive research in the university structure 
when most of the money comes from federal sources . The sheer volume 
of funds creates pressures of the utmost importance in universities. 
If federal financing of research leads to a loss of freedom by univer -
sities and by investigators, the universities and the scientific com-
munity are in a precarious position.20 
There is little doubt that university research in all fields is 
more extensive and in most fields of higher average quality. However, 
the amount and complexity of the total research effort does not seem 
to have stifled the individual. Large amounts of federal funds are 
being provided for basic research--basic in the sense that investiga-
tions are not limited to an iarnediate practica 1 end, and that scientists 
are free to pursue their own lines of investigation. Competent scientists 
using federal monies are permitted to do the research they want to do. 
Basic research is better financed in this country than ever before. 21 
Basic Research 
Basic research has been variously defi ned . However, the fo ll ow-
ing definition provided by the National Science foundation is considered 
the most appropriate. 
Basic research is that type of research directed 
towards increase of knowledge in science. I t is research 
where t he primary aim of the investigator is a fuller 
20Ibid . ' p. 53. 
21 Ibid . , p . 211 . 
knowledge or understanding of the subject under 
study, rather than a practical application thereof.22 
Despite the large amount of government research funds, the 
freedom of the university and individual scientists has not been 
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curtailed, but has, in many respects, been extended through their use. 
Although the federal government may have threatened constantly to dis-
tort universities by giving greater emphasis to applied or developmental 
than to basic research, the process of mutual adaptation has kept the 
threat a potential one.23 
Government-sponsored research administered by the various govern-
ment agencies, and in particular the Department of Defense, has had a 
greater interest in applied and developmental research than in basic 
research. Since the aims of applied and developmental research meet 
the requirements of the mission-related programs of national defense 
and other public purposes, it was often indicated that the universities 
were participating in too great a portion of this type research as com-
pared to the amount of basic research being accomplished. 
This excessive participation in applied research was felt to be 
a detriment to the creation of knowledge, one of the prime aims of a 
university, along with the preservation and transmission of knowledge. 
However, American universities also have a strong tradition of service 
to the community and feel an obligation to help gove rnments, state and 
local industries, and economic and social groups solve immediate prob-
lems. It was therefore inevitable that the federal agencies would 
22u.s. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science IX, 
(Washington, D.C., 1960), p. 24. 
23J. D. Millett, Financing Higher Education in the Unit ed States 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1952), p. 335. 
124 
turn to the universities and that they would respond to the needs of 
the government.24 
However true that the emphasis on applied and developmental 
research may have been in the past, and it may also be true today, 
it would be difficult to arrive at a conclusion that basic research 
is being neglected. An examination of this area revealed that uni-
versities are getting more federal support for basic research than 
ever before. The magnitude of these expenditures with universities 
is reflected in the rising expenditures of the past three years going 
from approximately $415 million in fiscal year 1961 to an estimated 
$578 million in fiscal year 1962, and an estimated $778 million in 
fisca l year 1963. It is also interesting to note that 52 percent of 
all federal funds ($1.12 billion) for basic research obligated in 
fiscal year 1962 was distributed among the universities, up from 41 
percent in fiscal year 1961.25 
Objectives of Federal Agencies vs. 
Objectives of Universities 
However, there is a degree of incompatibility between the objec-
tives of the individual federal agencies and those of the universities 
since federal agencies have f uncti ons that are not necessarily best 
discharged by acting in a way most congenial to the universities. 
These objectives range from provision of the national defense to pro-
motion of the general welfare while those of the universities are 
24Kidd, p. 26. 
25u. s. National Science Foundation, Federal Funds for Science 
XI (Washington, D.C.,l963), pp. 127-1 29. 
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education, research, and community service. As these broad purposes 
have interacted on one another since World War II, especially in 
contract research, there has been much debate over the government-
university research relationship.26 
One area of debate over federal project-oriented research is 
that the project system transfers control of the directions which 
inquiries should take from the institutions to the government agency 
which approves and disapproves projects. Projects and their sponsors 
have been accused of taking away the prerogatives of the universities 
performing government research under contract, and there have been 
pressures to give the universities greater control over research 
through the use of grants , rather than through contracts.27 
The Use of Grants or Contracts 
The two methods used by the government to obtain research 
services are by the use of contract and the other by the use of grants. 
Under the contract method, the "product" purchased is research--although 
grants may also in effect purchase research. The research contract is 
considered by many an imperfect instrument for this purpose with its 
concept of services purchased and its inherent red tape and government 
administration.28 
26u.s. National Science Foundation, 11th Annual Report (Washington, 
D.C., 1961), p. 153. 
27Paul Lancaster, "Guilding the Ivy," Wall Street Journal, Feb-
ruary 19, 1960, p. 1. 
2Bu.s. White House, The President 's Science Advisory Committee, 
The Universities and the Federal Government, November 15, 1960, p. 8. 
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The grant method is generally considered to support research 
rather than purchase it--although this distinction is more imaginary 
than real. Generally, however, grants are provided for the pursuit 
of research having broad objectives rather than for a specific pro-
ject. On the other hand, contracts have also been l e t in recent years 
for broad objectives with relatively long-time schedules for completion. 
However, the use of grants allows the university greater flexibility 
and freedon and there is inherently less red tape and government admin-
istration involved. For these reasons, the grant is generally pre-
ferred. 29 
Overhead Costs 
One disadvantage of the grant is that it often fails to provide 
for the full cost of the research that is supported, mainly because 
Congress has placed a 20 percent limitation on overhead costs in con-
nection with research grants. Because of this, there has been a 
recent trend by some universities to refuse grants for some research 
when offered, but t o accept a contract for the same research. In the 
fiscal year 1963, the Army indicates that 57 gra nts were refused and 
contracts had been awarded in lieu thereof. The amount of these 
refusals totaled $2,774 million. During the same period, the Air 
Force had 12 refusals amounting to $549,945 because of the 20 percent 
limitation. As an example. Princeton University accepted a contract 
for $270,700 in lieu of a grant for which it was allowed overhead 
29rbid. 
127 
rates of 70 percent based on a percentage of salaries and wages.30 
From this trend it is evident that many universities do not 
consider the governmental contractual arrangements too burdensome at 
this time. However, the number of grants being accepted by far out-
numbers those being rejected, so it is also true that most univer-
sities ' preference for this arrangement outweighs the objection to 
the absorption of some costs. The Air Force estimated that in its 
grants, the universities absorbed overhead costs of almost $2 million 
and to this extent supported the government in its research effort.3l 
The major issue is the question whether the government should pay the 
full cost of the research it sponsors or whether t he university should 
sometimes contribute to this cost. In addition to payment of direct 
costs of equipment, materials, salaries, etc . , is the governn1ent 
obligated to pay for indirect costs reasonably attributable to govern-
ment financed projects? Allocation of overhead costs is difficult and 
there is no magic formula which can provide the answer . However, the 
c osts are real and any university taking on a large volume of govern-
ment research without seeking payment of indirect costs would certainly 
find itself in serious financial difficulty.3 2 
The Department of Defense policy in this regard is to pay full 
overhead costs, if possible. The Secretary of Defense stated, however: 
30 U.S . House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the Committee on 
Appropriations, Hearings,Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, 
Part 6, 88th Cong., lst Sess.{Washington, D.C., 1963), p. 116. 
31Th~. 
32Alice M. Rivlin, The Role of the Federal Government in Financing 
Higher Education {Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1961), 
p. 52 . 
This is why I say that the universities are sub-
sidizing the Department of Defense. Because our 
payments to the universities for research which they 
conduct at our request arenot large enough to cover 
the costs of brick and mortar.33 
Benefits to the University 
The acceptance of research projects, whether through grants 
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or contracts, is advantageous to the universities in many respects. 
The incidental benefits may include enhancement of faculty and in-
stitution prestige, exploitable patents, support of graduate students 
through research assistantships, and freeing of general university 
research funds for departments, mainly arts and humanities, which 
receive little or no federal support. Further, institutions because 
of sponsored research programs, can attract and hold better instruc-
tors and graduate students. These are real benefits, even though 
they cannot be priced. Direct benefits are generally related to 
the addition and construction of research facilities and equipment.34 
Advancement of National Objectives 
The total sum of all federally-sponsored research, whether 
in support of university r esearch thr ough gran ts for proj ects no t 
relevant to any spec ific goal or a federal agency or in direct support 
of a specific task of such an agency, can be considered a declaration 
of national objectives and an expression of national policy. The in-
volvement of universities in federal research is not entirely to help 
33u.s. Senate, Subcommi ttee of the Committee on Appr opriations, 
Hearings, Department of Defense Appropriations for 1964, 88th Gong . , 
lst Ses s (Washington, D, C., 1963), p. 170. 
J4Rivlin, p. 44. 
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them to do more of what they wish, but to involve them in the achieve-
ment of national goals established by the government. When research 
unrelated to a specific federal agency's objective is supported, 
it is to expand the nation ' s research resources, which is a declared 
national policy. Since unrelated research and the support of a specific 
research project to further a federal agency's objective both further 
national objectives, these two considerations may warrant the full pay-
ment of all costs for federally sponsored research despite the benefits 
accruing to the university in pursuing such research.35 
Protection for the University 
An opposing view to the full payment of all costs, is based 
on the view that cost parlicipation by the university is essential 
in order to protect the university from undue federal influence or 
control, and further because of the benefits received--both direct 
and indirect. It is thought that through university cost partici-
pation, the faculty members involved in the research and the institu-
tion will be in a stronger position to resist any effort on the part 
of the federal agency to control that research. In such a situation, 
the fact that the university paid 10 to 20 percent of the research 
cost would not alter the situation very much. Compulsory cos t partici-
pation could indeed restrict the freedom of the university and its 
faculty members. I n some instances this cost participation in federal 
research might reduce the volume of research supported entirely by the 
university. The only major protection for a university engaged in 
35Kidd, p. 93. 
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federal research to retain a substantial degree of freedom in its 
research program is to obtain a substantial part of all programs 
from non-federal resources. Further, when performing federal re-
search, it must insist on favorable terms and conditions which will 
allow them to retain a high degree of control of their own affairs. 36 
The breadth of federal authority and the breadth of the missions 
of the federal agencies and the amount of money available to finance 
research in universities are in many respects a protection to them. 
This money has been provided for virtually all kinds of research. 
This has resulted in reduced tendency for the possibility of university 
control by federal agencies. Exertion of individual pressures by 
agencies to increase the amount of research of interest to them has 
resulted ln greatly nullifying the number and variety of pressures 
from all agencies combined . Similarly, the large number of agencies 
which support work, often of the same kind, protects scientists and 
universities. The principle of diversity of research support has been 
adopted by the government and this provides the competition so necessary 
for protection.37 
The major threat to the freedom of universities is not the 
exercise of arbitrary authority of government bureaucrats but the 
effect that federal funds have on the universities in resolving prob-
lems such as: (a) exertion by universities of countervailing forces 
against the pressure to expand the physical sciences; (b) the implica-
tions of expanding the volume of research on the capacity of the 
36Ibid. 
37Ibid., p. 213. 
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universities to teach the impending wave of students; (c) how to 
attract and retain teachers with research talent when competing with 
industry, substantially supported by federal money; and (d) how to 
withstand the temptation to accept federal funds which would divert 
them from their primary functions.3 8 
38Ibid., p. 228. 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Unpredictability and the Constraints 
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The large expenditures of the United States for the development 
of modern weapons systems along with outlays for their logistics sup-
port, manning, and deployment have had a major impact on the nation--
its economy, its institutions, and its people. Certainly very few 
activities, if any, have remained unaffected. 
A large segment of American industry has been affected because 
development of modern weapons systems is conducted in an environment 
that is unique in character and quite different from ordinary commer-
cial activity. The control of development time, ultimate costs, and 
the quality of a major weapons system has been fraught with unpredict -
ables. The fact that major development programs have suffered cost 
escalations of 200 to 300 percent and schedule slippages of one to 
three years - -when measured against original targets -- is well known 
to government and industrial managers. Since much of the effort 
invo l ves research and development activities, whose ou t comes have 
been generally unpredictable, the uncertainties have existed to a 
greater degree than in the ordinary industrial environment. Fur-
ther, the development which is sought attempts to discover a new and 
different technology and demands an order of magnitude of improvement 
over anything achieved before. 
Ad vances in technology may make the program obsolete and thus 
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cause its termination. Changes in defense policies, budget changes, 
changes in officials, and change in the intelligence of enemy capabil -
ities, among others, may cause the alteration or even the cancellation 
of the program. These uncertainties have introduced a large element of 
uncertainty for those engaged in the we~pons business. 
In addition to the risks introduced by these uncertainties, the 
weapons market is also peculiar to the extent that the government is 
the sole purchaser of weapons systems. The weapons market bears little 
resemblance to the consumer or commercial markets because the govern-
ment, as the buyer, prescribes the product it desires rather than the 
entrepreneur offering specific products for sale. 
Because the government is the sole buyer of weapons products 
and can exercise the power of a monopsonist and because the nature and 
performance of the product is considered so critica l, constraints have 
been placed upon the defense industry which are not customarily found in 
private industry. Some contracts for weapons systems specify not only 
what is to be produced, but also how and with what materials, how much 
subcontracting is to be done, and who the subcontractors are to be. 
Government personnel in residence at the industrial site constant ly 
monitor all aspects of development, production, and costs in ma ny cases. 
The government- industrial relationship in development programs is quite 
unlike any situation in the civilian sector. Although industry would 
like to have this relationship relaxed to some extent, it is unlikely 
that this will occur in the fore~eeable future because of the complexity 
and performanc e requirements of the product, the high costs ihvolved, and 
because of the many uncertainties which necessitate constant changes in 
the product. 
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Although these uncertainties pertaining to time, cost, and 
quality outcomes have existed for an extended period, the current view 
by the Department of Defense is that these problems have been due mainly 
to inadequate planning and treating all develo pmen t projects in an 
identical manner. Consequently the basic concept of deve lopment work 
has been reorganized. This concept briefly requires that before any 
large scale development work takes place that a single plan be established 
which defines what is wanted, what the design will be, when it is wanted, 
how it is to be built, and the cost of the program. Further, a descrip-
tion of the management techniques to control the project is also required. 
This concept is known as "project definition." 
Through the use of "proj ect definition" the increased use of in-
centive type contracts is possible. By providing contractors with 
incentives for increased profits, it is hoped to improve performance 
factors of the end product, improve deliveries, and reduce costs- - those 
things which have been the major problems in the past. 
In conclusion, the adoption of "project definition," with its 
precise establishment of the pr ogram, including the management techniques 
to be used in control of the program is an indication that close survei l-
lance and con trol of development contracts will continue indefinitely. 
The Changing Geography 
Over the past decade the product mix of weapons systems has 
evolved from wheeled- type weapons, conventional arms and munitions, to 
complex aircraft and missiles having a heavy reliance on electronics . 
This has resul t ed in a major impact on a large section of the American 
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economy. The location of those industries which provide weapons pro-
ducts to the gove rnment has changed as a result of the evo l ution which 
has taken place in weapons systems. The Eas t, Nor th Centra l, and Middle 
Atlant ic states have been the major losers of government business in 
the wea pons area, while the Mountain and Pacific states have been the 
major gainers. 
These geographical shifts have had ma j or consequences for the 
areas involved. Those areas which have gained business as a result of 
weapons contracts have often been faced with the problems of rapid growth, 
while t hey have also been faced with prob lems of reduced s pending on 
major weapons programs . These reducti ons have, in many instances , re-
sulted in a high rate of unemp l oyment for specific communiti es and 
cities. 
There has been concern over the effects of reduced defens e expend-
itures not on l y for individual a r eas and industries but also for the 
total economy as well. As a result of this concern, a national study 
gr oup, The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Age ncy , has been 
established to pre pare for the possibi lity of reduced expenditures for 
defense purposes. Furth er, studies a r e being conducted to ascertain 
the effects of shifting defens e procurement and what to do about mini-
mizing them. 
The Small Business Community 
In addition t o t he geographi c concentra tion of military spending, 
there has been a tendency for the concentration of defense contracts in 
the hands of a relatively small group of large corporations . This has 
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raised fears of the possibility of monopoly, and Congress and the 
Executive Branch have insisted on the establishment of programs within 
the Department of Defens e , the Small Business Administration , and other 
government agencies to assure that small business receives a "fair 
share 11 of government business. 
The small business program encompasses numerous activities such 
as financial aid, management, and other types of executive counselling, 
as well as aid in obtaining government con tracts. Aid in obtaining 
government contracts was born out of concern over the impact of military 
procurement upon the economic structure of the nation because of the 
magnitude of the dollar volume of such buying. 
This concern increased when, in the face of mounting expenditures 
for defense, the small business community continued to receive a declin-
ing share of government contracts. The change from traditional concepts 
of warfare to the concepts of the atomic and space age was changing the 
procurement pattern of the services. Henceforth, the major portion of 
expenditures would be for complex missiles and aircraft and electronics 
systems, while such items as subsistence, textiles, clothing, and con-
ventional weapons would receive a lesser share. Since small business 
is unable to fully cope with the complexities of developing a major 
weapons system~ this result was inevitable. However , the many programs 
designed to provide small business with additional government business 
have done much to offset the effects of weapons system procurement on 
sma 11 business. 
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Research and Development 
Expenditures for government-sponsored research and development 
approximates 75 percent of the total dollars spent for this purpose in 
the United States. With only 25 percent of these expenditures devoted 
to objectives purely for the civilian sector, industry has shown some 
concern that the concentration of research and development for govern-
ment objectives has caused a serious imbalance and may cause lagging 
employment in the future and may deter productivity increases. Industry 
is concerned that the huge requirements for scientific and engineering 
personnel for government research is diverting these scarce skills from 
industry with consequent damage to the economy at large. 
On the other hand, there is the belief, shared by the author, 
that without the stimu lus of government-sponsored research, the resource 
base of scientists and engineers would not be as large as it is. Fur-
ther, there is much documentation to show that research for military 
purposes has resulted in major benefits to the civilian sector in new 
inventions, new processes, and in increased productivity. The difference 
between military research and civilian research is much less real than 
actual. Nevertheless, it is deemed necessary that the primary benefit 
to be derived from mili t ary research is a strong defense posture and any 
other benefits to be derived are secondary in importance. 
The University 
In addition to the reliance on colleges and universities to 
provide the scientific and engineering manpower required for research 
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and development) the government has come to depend on these in s titutions 
to perform an increasing amount of research and development work in 
defense as well as other areas. 
It is felt that the stress on research work and the absorption 
of the best graduates for government-sponsored research are l eaving 
many universities dependent on the lower caliber graduate students to 
perforn1 undergraduate teaching. Further, many of the best faculty 
members are so involved in research work that their services are all 
but lost to the teaching mission of the university. By reducing the 
number of professors and the time of some which can be made availab l e 
for teaching, class sizes are necessarily enlarged, thereby reducing 
the teacher-student contact. Further, the demand that federal research 
and development requirements have made on scientific and engineering 
personnel have drawn many university teachers and potential teachers 
into industrial research work. 
There has also been concern over the ability of the universities 
to provide the required personnel for the future needs of the nation in 
the scientific, engineering, and mathematics a r eas. The need for funds 
assistance to provide increased and improved facilities to the univer-
sities has been recognized and some pr oposals have been advanced for 
fed era 1 aid. 
Since there is already a large amou nt of federal funds going to 
universities for the performance of research and development tasks for 
the government, there have been fears that there is danger that the 
freedom of the university is being threatened . The large volume of 
federal funds does create pressures on the universities. However, 
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there has been a diversity of research and development because of the 
different types of research being sponsored by the various agencies of 
the government. Thus, the exertion of individual pressures by various 
government departments to increase the amount of research of interest 
to them has in a sense nullified the number and variety of pressures 
from all agencies combined. 
It would appear that the monies being spent by the federal govern-
ment have provided the means for more extensive research and of higher 
average quality. Further, there has been no great restriction of indi-
vidual freedom in the pursuit of basic research-- that is, research 
which is not confined to an immediate practical end. Scientists are 
permitted to do the research they desire to do--and wi th federal fu nds. 
Although the pressures have been there, the danger of the loss of 
freedom to the university has only been a potential one. 
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